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ABSTRACT: 
Technology permeates and is an integral part of the whole social, 
economic, cultural and political fabric of society. The state of the tech-
nology which exists at a particular point in time is, amongst other things, 
the product of many individual decisions and preferences by governments, 
industry, individuals and the community. Whilst some technology involves 
substantially new developments, much of it is evolutionary and occurs 
largely out of sight. 
The same is true of the process of Technology Transfer which at its 
most fundamental level involves the movement of knowledge across bound-
aries. The processes and methods of technology transfer vary according to 
the type and nature of the technology to be transferred. During any trans-
fer process however a number of factors may be involved either depend-
ently or independently, these include people, organisation structure and 
culture, and the economic and political environments. 
The Snowy Mountains Scheme, a dual purpose hydro-electric and 
irrigation complex, widely regarded as being one of Australia's greatest 
engineering achievements, provides an example of the transfer of technology 
from one country to another. The Scheme as it was finally constructed 
was first suggested in 1926 though no firm action was taken until 19^8 
when a joint committee comprising representatives of the Commonwealth, 
New South Wales and Victorian Governments confirmed the viability of 
a dual purpose scheme. The Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Authority 
was created by an Act of Federal Parliament in 1949 and was charged 
with the responsibility of constructing the Scheme. 
It is argued that neither the technology nor the resources necessary 
for the planning and construction of the Schenne were available in Australia 
at that tinne, and that without the assistance of the United States Bureau of 
Reclannation (U.S.B.R.) the commencennent of the Scheme and its subsequent 
development would have been significantly delayed. It is further argued 
that this assistance was a form of technology transfer with the U.S.B.R, 
transferring to the Snowy Mountains Authority (SMA) and thus to Australia, 
technology in the form of hydro-electric and irrigation concepts, designs 
and work practices. An examination of how and why this transfer took 
place provides insights into aspects of the technology transfer processes 
particularly within Government and Statutory Bodies. 
INTRODUCTION 
Technology when described in its widest sense includes a tool, technique 
or social organisation or process. It is also useful to think of technology in 
the following ternns as argued by 3ones: 
"Technology is a perishable resource comprising knowledge, skills and 
the means of using and controlling factors of production for the purpose 
of producing, delivering to users, and maintaining goods and services 
for which there is an economic and/or social demand." (p.vi)[lj 
Given these comments, technology permeates and is an integral part 
of the whole social, economic, cultural and political fabric of society. 
There is no optimal technology in an absolute sense [2j. The way to 
organise some purposeful activity is best or better relative to a particular 
complex of resources that are to be organised and to the particular circumstances 
in which the activity will operate. Indeed the state of technology existing at 
any one point in time is a product of evolution over time within the economic, 
social and political environment [3J. It is also the product of many individual 
decisions and preferences by governments, industry, individuals and the com-
munity and the multiple interactions between these preferred choices. 
In dealing with technology there is a tendency to consider it only in 
terms of the visible and distinctive peaks, the wholly or substantially new 
product and processes, and to ignore the mass of evolutionary technological 
change which proceeds spontaneously and largely out of sight. [^J There 
is a similar tendency to focus on a single element or factor such as foreign 
ownership or capital inflow, and to be myopic about the myriad of other 
issues that play a part in technological change and technology transfer. In 
this regard it must be remembered that technological change is often a 
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cumulative process [3j and each extension of knowledge and each new solution 
to a technological problem creates the potential for further change. The 
development of this potential does not take place automatically however, and 
requires considerable human effort and commitment of resources. That is 
to say that whilst the application of rational principles to the control and 
re-ordering of space and matter is central to technology it should not be 
forgotten that these processes are concerned with human ends.[6j 
Not only does the development of new technologies require effort and 
commitment but so too does the transfer of technologies from one area to 
another. 3ust as there are a large number of definitions and models of tech-
nology, some of which stumble into the methodological pitfall of reification of 
technology as an object[7j , whilst others suffer from a single deterministic 
approach, so too there are a large number of models of technology transfer 
which emphasise differing aspects of the writer's individual frames of reference. 
Rather than become embroiled in argument over a precise definition of 
technology transfer it should be recognised at the most fundamental level that 
we are dealing with the movement of knowledge across interfaces while keep-
ing in mind that there may be important distinctions between specific sub-
elements within such a general framework.[8j As there appears to be no 
single best method to analyse the transfer process so too there appears to be 
no best method for analysing the phenomena which comprise the transfer 
process. 
Transfer processes and methods in technological change involve a wide 
range of factors including but not confined to people[9j, organisational, struc-
tural and political aspects. Once it is recognised that there is no one best 
method to achieve technology transfer it becomes necessary to ask how did 
the process take place and why. Technology is moved by people: it does not 
move of its own accord. It is not a black box which can be shifted at will 
from one situation to another.[10j To adopt the transfer process efficiently 
to accommodate such changes calls for the removal of unnecessary constraints 
on communication among participants, and therein lies the strength of Burns' 
(1966) statement that "technology transfer is a process of agents not 
agencies". [11J 
Individuals can fulfil both formal and informal roles. Formal agents 
include liaison or transfer officers whose major function is to promote trans-
fer and who operate at the interface between their own organisations and 
potential receiver organisations. This model is based on the use of agents 
within the US Agricultural Extension Service of the late nineteenth century. 
[12j Whilst formal agents can be used as mechanisms to encourage and facili-
tate technology transfer processes, their success is dependent on their ability 
to act as the interface between the source of technical assistance and the 
potential customer. Informal agents are any of the myriad of people involved 
at different levels in the transfer process but who may not have been given 
or assumed the formal role of transfer agents. In situations where the technology 
to be transferred is so complex or novel that only the innovator fully under-
stands it and its potential, agents who lack close knowledge of the technology 
may not be aware of the difficulties in achieving an appropriate contextual 
fit in a new environment and thus are not able to positively assist in the 
transfer process. 
The level and type of communication about the technology also affects 
its successful transfer. Certain types of information can only be effectively 
exchanged by face to face communication, for whilst the distribution of docu-
mentation may ensure a minimal level of awareness, it is the combination 
of documentation and personal interaction which enables the level of com-
munication necessary for effect ive transfer to be achieved. 
As with communications, the motivation of both individuals and organi-
sations can have significant e f fec ts on transfer. Motivation is most often 
thought of as operating at the level of the individual however there is a corres-
ponding level of receptivity which operates at the organisational level and 
which also a f fec t s the mechanism and success of technology transfer. Receptivity 
in an intra organisational sense, is a function of the perceived appropriateness 
of the particular technology. It is also influenced by the long term objectives 
and plans of the organisation. 
Just as behavioural features influence the mechanisms and outcomes 
of technology transfer programs, so too do various aspects of the relationship 
between the technology producing, transferring and receiving organisations. 
There are formal aspects of this relationship, such as the contractural arrange-
ments under which the technology transfer is carried out, and also the con-
textual ones which have their origins in the nature and abilities of the parties. 
Personal contacts established through programs, courses, meetings and 
visitor services, all help to build up knowledge about and establish contacts 
important for effect ive technology transfer. Visits can ensure familiarity 
with latest techniques and therefore can transfer these back for application 
and modification of the technical or work practices. 
Whilst strategic human resources are one of the prerequisites for success-
ful t ransfer , others include the scientific and technical infrastructure, and 
international co-operation [13j including the role of the s tate . 
The technology infrastructure or delivery system is the key linking net-
work between the producers and users of technology. It functions amongst 
other things to bring perceived or articulated user needs to the attention 
of funders and research technology producers, and in turn delivers research 
results or technology to meet stated user requirements. 
Technology delivery systems within industrialised nations have been 
broadly defined by four categories of participants according to Anyos [ H j . 
These include "Funders or Entrepreneurs" which include public or private 
organisations that provide financial resources for the development or adaptation 
of technologies. In the USA this role is taken primarily by Federal Govern-
ment agencies such as NASA, and large private sector producers such as 
IBM and General Motors. "Research and Development Producers" are found 
in both public and private sector organisations. These include government 
laboratories, universities, research institutes and private research and develop-
ment activities. These may be funded either internally or via government 
processes. "Linking Agents or Brokers" are those public or private organisations 
or individuals that expedite the movement or diffusion of the technology 
within or across national boundaries. This category is said to comprise func-
tional interest groups, professional organisations, trade associations, consult-
ants, and any others who work to utilise new technologies on existing problems. 
In these cases it is the brokers role to identify applications within the public 
and private sectors, recognising that utilisation will almost inevitably involve 
modification and adaptation to meet the expressed needs of the user. The 
final category of participants are the "Users". This group is broadly charact-
erised by two generally different participants: those who benefit directly 
from the transfer of a given technology, usually the private sector, and those 
who benefit indirectly from the transfer, the ultimate user or consumer of 
the product of the technology. 
In addition to the Anyos model of explaining infrastructure, it is argued 
that management forms an important part of the infrastructure because at 
the actual point of implementation of technology transfer, management which 
in the organisational sense is the process of utilising material and human 
resources to accomplish designated objectives, is essential.[15j Each individual 
project presents special problems and the choice and application of mechanisms 
such as human resources, organisation design and structure, use of contracts, 
transfer of patent rights and licencing, and the identification of technology 
brokers or "catalysts" can only be resolved and optimised at the working 
level. 
Support for and through the technology infrastructure is only one of 
the ways that the s tate influences the transfer of technology. Young [16J 
speaks of government involvement as being either regulatory or non-regulatory. 
In the former, influence is through economic and legal frameworks including 
traditional micro economic measures such as fiscal policy, bank rates, credit 
policies, e tc , taxation policies and Companies and Trade Practices Acts. 
Non regulatory measures may range from exhortation and voluntary agree-
ment through the provision of advice and services [17j including consultancies, 
and government research establishments, to the development of a system 
of financial inducements for particular types of developments such as reg-
ional policies, re-equipment schemes, and specific public support for cer ta in 
industries and developments. Since at least the early 19^0's the governments 
of all industrialised countries have been playing an increasingly direct role 
in the promotion and direction of their national industries. The role of pro-
moter of technology is of ten assumed by governments because of the high 
risk and high costs involved in the development of new technologies. 
It has also been argued that Governments resort to intervention as a 
means of prodding s t ra tegic parts of the economy [18J. Dell [19J has argued 
tha t the four major influences of the growth of these interventionist policies 
were the growth of international competit ion which eroded the basis of 
la issez-faire f r ee t rade policies, a feeling of economic fai lure especially 
following the depression of the 1930's, the increasing recognition of d i f ferences 
between private and social costs, and the emergence of specific social require-
ments that could not be met without the intervention of the s ta te . This 
last group comprises such diverse aspects as education, deployment of labour, 
and provision of energy [20]. The role of government in promoting economic 
growth and limiting the simultaneous social disbenefits has become a centra l 
plank in modern industrial society.[21J 
The role of governments in promoting technological innovation includ-
ing t ransfer is also a political one. According to Wells [22j, the spectacular 
achievements arising from the application of science and technology in the 
1940s in the USA led to major innovations which in a very brief period of 
t ime resulted in the creat ion of new industries, the restructuring of some 
and the demise of others. 
In the American aerospace, electronics, nuclear and petrochemical 
fields vast new complexes of industrial, government and university research 
centres were established as the result of political decisions by Presidents 
Roosevelt and Truman to extend the Government's responsibilities for science 
beyond merely their establishment but rather to couple science and government 
to serve the national interest. This promotion of technology in particular 
sectors in order to realise various national goals should not be seen in isola-
tion however for not only is technology used to fill defined needs, but social 
needs and values are themselves built and shaped by technology. The success 
of government collaboration with science during the 19^0s led to increased 
government support of scientific enquiry which represented a major institution-
alisation of science and technology as a formal tool for achieving govern-
ment policy and corporate development [23J. 
The transfer of technology cannot in most cases serve as a substitute 
for industrial research and development [2^J. Certain of the most advanced 
technologies cannot be learned in a formal way, and can only be absorbed 
in laboratories, similar to research and development activity. Bought tech-
nologies require adaptation to local conditions or products, and this adapta-
tion generally though not always requires research and development. Addi-
tionally the absorption of new technologies requires early preparation, and 
the establishment of a capability able to develop its know-how towards the 
new field. 
Whilst the establishment of research and development laboratories 
and facilities are generally associated with private industry, it is no less 
true of technology transfer to government departments and agencies. How-
ever, for transfer to be successful in the government sector an understanding 
is required not only of the problems faced by the private sector but also 
of the overall problems and issues with which the government is faced. 
A basic requirement for successful technology transfer is that the source 
possess technical knowledge and/or capability which could be useful to the 
receiver [25j. Additionally the source must understand the needs and limitations 
of the receiver. The receiver on the other hand should have complementary 
knowledge and capability, should understand the circumstances and potential 
contributions of the source, should demonstrate interest and support this 
with its own incentives. If these conditions are met, and if there is mutual 
confidence between the source and the receiver, then the way will be open 
for successful technology transfer. 
An example of the process of technology transfer is provided by the re-
lationship between the United States Bureau of Reclamation and the Snowy 
Mountains Hydro-electric Authority. Whilst the role of the Commonwealth 
Government is well known, little has been said of the role of the State Govern-
ments of Victoria and New South Wales, and even less about the role played 
by the Bureau with respect to the Snowy Mountains Scheme through the pro-
vision of technical assistance, technical advice in both the USA and Australia, 
and the training in America of Australian engineers by the Bureau. An exam-
ination of the roles of both sender and receiver of technology should therefore 
provide insights into the involvement of people, the infrastructure and the 
government in the process of technology transfer. 
A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SNOWY MOUNTAINS SCHEME 
The Snowy Mountains Scheme, a dual purpose hydro-electric and irriga-
tion complex established by a Commonwealth Act, is located in south-eastern 
Australia. It impounds the south flowing waters of the Snowy River and its 
tributary, the Eucumbene, at high elevations of the Great Dividing Range, 
and diverts them inland to the Murray and Murrumbidgee Rivers through 
two tunnel systems driven through the Snowy Mountains. The Scheme also 
involves the regulation and utilisation of the headwaters of the Murrumbidgee, 
Tumut, Tooma and Geehi Rivers. 
These diverted waters, in conjunction with the regulated flows in the 
Geehi and Tumut River catchments, generate mainly peak load electricity 
for the Australian Capital Territory and the States of New South Wales and 
Victoria, as it passes through power stations to the irrigation areas inland 
from the Snowy Mountains. 
The Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Scheme as finally constructed 
involved the investigation, design and construction of 16 large dams and many 
smaller diversion structures, some 80 kilometres of aqueducts, over 1^3 kilo-
metres of tunnels, a pumping station and 7 surface and underground power 
stations. Its total generating capacity is 3 7̂ fO 000 kilowatts and, through 
diversion, regulation and control of the rivers, an additional annual equivalent 
of 2,360,000 megalitres of water is made available for irrigation purposes 
in the Murray and Murrumbidgee Valleys.[26j 
Broadly the Scheme falls into two sections: the southern Snowy-Murray 
development, and the northern Snowy-Tumut Development. Both developments 
are connected by tunnels to the Schenne's main regulating storage, Lake 
Eucumbene on the Eucumbene River. 
SNOWY-TUMUT DEVELOPMENT 
Figure 1. Cross sectional view of the two developments of 
the Scheme 
The Snowy-Murray Development involves the diversion of the Snowy 
River by a transmountain tunnel system to the Geehi River and thence to 
the Swampy Plain River, a tributary of the Murray. In passing through the 
tunnel system the diverted waters fall some 820 metres, generating 
1 500 000 kilowatts in Murray 1 and Murray 2 Power Stations. 
Additional power is generated in Guthega Power Station which utilises 
the rapidly falling water of the Upper Snowy River on the east of the Divide 
before it reaches the main tunnel system at Island Bend. 
An essential part of this development is the two-way-flow Eucumbene-
Snowy Tunnel which connects the Snowy River with Lake Eucumbene. When 
the flows in the Snowy and Geehi Rivers exceed the needs of the Murray 
power stat ions, water f rom the Snowy River at Island Bend is diverted through 
this tunnel for s torage in Lake Eucumbene. Low flows in the Snowy and 
Geehi Rivers are supplemented by drawing the stored water from Lake 
Eucumbene back through the same tunnel and delivering it to the t rans-
mountain tunnel system leading to the Murray power stations. 
Additional water is supplied to the transmountain tunnel a t Island Bend 
by the Jindabyne Project which pumps from Lake 3indabyne the run off from 
the Snowy catchment downstream of Island Bend. 
The Snowy-Murray Development provides 980 000 megalitres of addi-
tional water annually through the enlarged Hume Reservoir to the Murray 
River for irrigation in the Murray Valley. The total installed capacity of 
the Guthega, Murray 1 and Murray 2 Power Stations is 1 360 000 kilowatts. 
The Snowy-Tumut Development provides for the diversion of the Eucum-
bene, the Upper Murrumbidgee and the Tooma Rivers to the Tumut River, 
and for the combined waters of these four rivers to generate electr ici ty in 
four projects: Tumut 1, Tumut 2, Tumut 3 and Blowering, in their fall of 
800 metres before release to the Tumut and thence to the Murrumbidgee. 
By agreement the Authority carried out the design and construction of Blower-
ing Dam as an agent for the State of New South Wales, and the operation 
of Blowering Reservoir is the responsibility of the NSW Government. 
The transmountain tunnel system includes the Eucumbene-Tumut Tunnel 
connecting Lake Eucumbene with Tumut Pond Reservoir. The normal function 
of the tunnel is to divert water through the Great Dividing Range from Lake 
Eucumbene to the Tumut River but, during periods of high flow in the Tumut 
and Tooma Rivers, water in excess of that required for operating the power 
stations in the Tumut Valley is diverted in a reverse direction through the 
tunnel to Lake Eucumbene for storage. The total installed capacity in Tumut 1, 
2 and 3 and Blowering Power Stations is 2 180 000 kilowatts, and this section 
of the Scheme provides some 1 380 000 megalitres of additional water annually 
to the Murrumbidgee River. [28j 
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A HISTORY OF MOVEMENT TOWARDS A WATER-POWER SCHEME 
Australia is a country of dramatic geographical changes ranging 
from tropical rainforests and rugged mountain ranges, to treeless plains 
and stony deserts. These varying conditions are accompanied and matched 
by the variations in climatic conditions. From the beginning of western 
recorded history in Australia the country has been beset by the somewhat 
cyclical fluctuations of drought and if not plenty, then at least sufficiency. 
In addition to droughts, high annual and seasonal rainfall variability have 
serious e f fec t s on dry land agriculture and pastoral output and hence the 
country's overall economy. Australia is the world's driest continent, and 
by world standards its water resources are relatively meagre.[l j 
In the light of this it is not surprising that the Scheme was originally 
conceived of solely in terms of irrigation and as a defence against drought. 
This is particularly so when one considers that within two years of settle-
ment of Sydney Cove the push outwards in search of suitable water supplies 
had already begun. 
Exploration continued rapidly during this early period with droughts 
being the major motivator. The boundaries in which settlers were allowed 
to select land were redefined in 1829 bringing the sanctioned area to a 
southern limit just south of Canberra and eastward to the sea, but as Governor 
Gipps was to comment: 
". . as well might it be attempted to confine the Arabs of the Desert 
within a circle, traced upon their sands, as to confine the graziers or 
woolgrowers of New South Wales within any bounds that can be properly 
them: and as certainly as the Arabs would be starved, so also would 
the flocks and herds of New South Wales, if they were so confined, 
and the prosperity of the Country be at an end."(p.l27)[2j 
By 18^5 it was estimated that there was a population of some 600 
in the area between Cooma and the main Snowy range. 
The relative frequency of droughts and their disastrous e f fec t s on 
primary production, the worst in 1893-1903 reduced Australian sheep numbers 
by more than 50%, cat t le by 30% and average wheat yields to 2A bushels 
per acre, the lowest ever recorded[3j, encouraged rural interests towards 
the end of the nineteenth century to look to the irrigation potential of 
the inland rivers. 
Alfred Deakin, then a Minister of the Victorian Government, accompanied 
by an engineer, journeyed to America, Egypt, India and Italy, to observe 
irrigation practices and appraise their suitability for Victorian conditions. 
While in the United States, Deakin met two Canadian brothers, the Chaffeys, 
who had established successful irrigation developments in Canada and elsewhere, 
and invited them to investigate the possibilities of similar enterprises in 
Victoria. This invitation was accepted and the Chaffeys started work 
in 1887 at Renmark and Mildura on the River Murray. Although at first 
they met difficulties and misfortune the Chaffeys were able to prove beyond 
doubt the feasibility of successful irrigation agriculture in Australia. 
A further significant event occurred in 1886 when the Victorian Govern-
ment passed "The Irrigation Act" which profoundly influenced the whole 
future of water development in Australia, by the conferring of public 
ownership on all water supplies, and by authorising the construction of 
Government works for water conservation and irrigation. Similar legisla-
tion followed subsequently in other States including New South Wales in 
1896. 
At about the same time the New South Wales Government set up 
the Royal Commission on Water Conservation, under the Presidency of 
W 3 Lyne MP (later Sir William Lyne). In 1884 P F Adams, Surveyor-General 
of New South Wales, in evidence before the Royal Commission, suggested 
that a diversion of the Snowy River to the Murrumbidgee for irrigation 
purposes might be possible at a point about 8 kilometres above the Snowy's 
junction with the Eucumbene. It was proposed that Snowy water would 
flow by means of a canal across the lowest gap on the watershed divid-
ing the Snowy from the Murrumbidgee to Slack's Creek, a tributary of 
the Murrumbidgee. This proposal meant, in e f fec t , that an open channel -
with no provision for a storage dam - would be excavated across the Great 
Dividing Range at an elevation of about 914 metres. 
As a result C Haylock, a New South Wales Government surveyor 
in charge of parts of the Cooma District, was requested to review Adam's 
proposal. Accordingly, Haylock commenced a survey about 17 km from 
Cooma on the road to Jindabyne, but was forced to abandon it af ter 50 
km on account of severe drought conditions. As no future opportunity 
presented itself for Haylock to continue, the Royal Commission in the 
following year deputed one of its members, J B Donkin, to determine the 
practicability of the proposed diversion. The investigation subsequently 
carried out by Donkin: 
. . placed beyond the reason of doubt the question as to whether 
the levels of the intervening country would permit of a diversion from 
the Snowy into the Murrumbidgee, but there still remains the task 
of demonstrating absolutely by a detailed survey and levelling whether, 
in view of the physical difficulties to be overcome, the necessary works 
can be constructed at a cost which would afford a reasonable presump-
tion that they would be remunerative."(p. 725)[^J 
Thus Donkin confirmed the physical practicability of Adams' earlier 
proposal, but left the question of its economic practicability unanswered. 
He foresaw however that: 
". . great national necessities warrant correspondingly bold measures 
of relief. The levels and general configuration of the country from 
the Snowy River to Lake George demand instrumental examination, 
as they apparently point to an endowment from Nature for the express 
purpose of conducting water from an enormous snow-fed reservoir 
to the rich plains of the Monaro, and thence, af ter being stored in 
Lake George, to be distributed over thousands of square miles of 
arable land lying in the doab of the Lachlan and Murrumbidgee Rivers, 
now subject to long periods of disastrous droughts which render 
futile the labour of husbandry, cripple all mining industry, and sur-
round with dread uncertainty every form of pastoral enterprise."(p.996) 
[3J 
Although the Lyne Royal Commission on Water Conservation high-
lighted Adams' proposal to divert the Snowy River and confirmed the 
viability of irrigation, no specific recommendations were made concerning 
the diversion of the Snowy River. There is no doubt that at the time this 
was a small issue compared with the paramount importance of the Murray 
and Murrumbidgee Rivers for irrigation. The question of the use of Snowy 
water for irrigation was however kept under review by the New South 
Wales Government as part of the work program of the newly created Water 
Conservation Service, a body established in terms of the New South Wales 
Water Act of 1896, as a branch of the Department of Mines and Agriculture 
(transferred later in the same year to the Department of Public Works). 
McKinney who as Principal Assistant Engineer for Water Conservation 
was responsible for the Service, also instituted a system of river gaugings 
and other studies of the Murrumbidgee and Murray. It is probably not 
too great a claim to say that the activities of the New South Wales Con-
servation Service helped to keep alive politically the question of the use 
of the waters of the Snowy particularly when public interest in the matters 
raised by the Lyne Royal Commission on Water Conservation was waning 
as a result of good seasons in the late 1880s and early 1890s.[6j 
Not all investigators were enthusiastic about the prospects of successfully 
diverting the Snowy River for irrigation at an economical cost, and Adams' 
original proposal for the diversion of the Snowy (as investigated by Haylock 
and Donkin) was still a live issue with the New South Wales Government who 
brought it to the notice of the 1902 Interstate Royal Commission on the 
River Murray. This Commission obviously thought the proposal practical 
because it instructed its Secretary, R T McKay, who was then Assistant 
Engineer, Water Supply Branch, NSW Department of Public Works, to 
conduct a further investigation which was purported to have eventually 
confirmed the view that Snowy water could be diverted across the Great 
Divide. 
Notwithstanding confirmation of the physical practicability of divert-
ing Snowy water inland, no action was taken by the New South Wales Govern-
ment to implement Adams' irrigation proposal. As noted previously, interest 
in the whole idea waned as good seasons followed the drought years of 
the latter half of the century. The proposal did however highlight the need 
for irrigation at that time in parts of southeastern Australia, especially as 
a defence against drought, and identified the State of New South Wales 
as the prime mover in the initial schemes for the use of Snowy waters. The 
question of diversion for irrigation was not revived as a formal expression of 
public policy until World War II, and then as part of a dual-purpose proposal 
advanced by the New South Wales Water Conservation and Irrigation Comm-
ission. 
The initial proposals for the use of Snowy waters for hydro-electric 
power, a process which simply refers to the method of generating electricity 
using pressurised water, were associated with the federation of the Australian 
states. The power potential of the Snowy River was first formally recog-
nised by T Pridham an Assistant Engineer attached to the Royal Commission 
on Sites for the Seat of Government of the Commonwealth, who reported 
favourably on the Snowy as a source of power for Dalgety which at that 
stage was a preferred site. In his report Pridham found that the best 
site for a large hydro-electric installation was: 
". . 22 miles from Dalgety, and suggested the construction of a tunnel 
about 3i miles in length and a storage reservoir upstream. It was 
estimated that such a scheme would ensure a constant flow through 
the tunnel of at least 1000 cubic feet per second which with a head 
of 300 fee t , would furnish 20 000 net horsepower continuously." 
(p.^83)[7j 
The power potential of the Snowy River was further confirmed by 
another governnnent employee, the surveyor C R Scrivener, who was re-
quested by the NSW Minister for Home Affairs, to obtain information on 
suitable sites in the southern Monaro for the proposed Federal capital. 
As a result of his investigation. Scrivener reported that: 
". . with a suitable equalising weir the waters of the Snowy River 
might be utilised for the generation of electrical power", 
but: 
". . it would be wise, in estimating the capacity of the river, to adopt 
a minimum flow of 200 cubic feet per second, in order to meet a 
year or a succession of years of abnormally low rainfall. Now a 
flow of 200 cubic feet per second will give 17 horsepower for each 
foot of fall on the basis of 75 per cent efficiency; therefore, with 
a fall of 100 fee t , 1 700 horsepower would be available. This fall, 
making due allowance for the necessity for placing the turbines 
above flood level, may be obtained between points on the Snowy 
River not more than one mile apart, in a direct line and within about 
five miles of the city site. With 1700 horsepower, water might be 
pumped from the river to the Service Reservoir, and the Federal 
City electrically lighted for many years."(p.50^f)[8j 
Pridham and Scrivener's investigation established the feasibility 
of the Snowy as the source of power for the proposed national capital 
and, when the present Canberra was finally selected in 1908 as the site, 
the limited availability of water power in the immediate locality was 
identified as being insufficient for future needs. (It should be noted that 
the capitals of Sydney and Melbourne were and are located within close 
proximity to coalfields which supply the fuel for their thermal stations.) 
Accordingly in 1909 the State of New South Wales agreed to allow the 
Commonwealth Government to use Snowy waters, without payment, for 
the provision of electric light and power for the then Federal Capital 
Territory.[9j The Commonwealth did not, at the time, exercise its powers 
in this regard, but the general principle of the use of Snowy waters for 
power was revived during World War I, as the New South Wales Public 
Works Department carried out surveys on the viability of using the waters 
in question for the generation of electricity for Sydney and the south 
eastern corner of the State. 
The first firm proposals for the use of Snowy waters for power 
generation were made in 1920. Following preliminary surveys by the New 
South Wales Department of Public Works, W Corin, Chief Electrical Engineer, 
recommended the: 
". . construction of a dam in the neighbourhood of 3indabyne, or possibly 
several dams on the contributing streams higher up. A race will lead 
thence to a subsidiary reservoir at Beloka Creek, the water being con-
veyed from this reservoir by a tunnel through the mountain and again 
by a short face to a pipe-head reservoir above Popong Creek, a fall 
of some 1 600 feet to the bed of the latter being obtained. The con-
figuration of the country is such that to take full advantage of this 
fall it will be necessary to divide it into two sections, placing one 
power station some 300 feet below the first pipe-head reservoir, and 
constructing a second power station when necessary to deal with the 
remaining 1 000 feet fall or more. For the initial development no 
dams are necessary, the unregulated flow of the river being sufficient 
to develop approximately 2k 000 kW continuously."(p.613)[10j 
The New South Wales Government took no action to implement this 
"Corin" or "Big Bend" scheme as it was known at that time and in 1937 a 
London firm of engineering consultants which had been commissioned by 
the New South Wales Government to investigate future dealing with the 
potential of the Snowy River for power generation recommended the con-
struction of a dam at 3indabyne with a tunnel and pipeline to deliver 
water to power stations on the Snowy River at Biddi Point, a distance 
of 29 km, in order to generate 250 000 kilowatts.[lIj 
This recommendation, essentially a power proposal with no provision 
for irrigation, had a mixed reception. In view of the limited advantages 
which would accrue to Victorian farmers through the use of Snowy waters 
for irrigation, Victoria was eager to see the development of the hydro-
electric scheme as recommended by the consultants. On the other hand, 
New South Wales farmers in the southern part of the State regarded such 
a purely power proposal as a waste of valuable irrigation water, and accord-
ingly, in February 1939, a meeting of water users at Griffith protested 
against the consultants' recommendation and formed the Murrumbidgee 
Valley Water Users' Association. 
Whilst New South Wales and Victoria were divided on the optimum 
use of Snowy waters, the recommendations posed the possiblity of the 
Snowy providing some of the electrical needs of growing urban popula-
tions and secondary industries. In common with the earlier irrigation 
investigations, however, the hydro-electric scheme advocated by the con-
sultants was regional rather than national in its concept. 
The first formal proposals for the use of the Snowy for water supply 
purposes were associated with the projected needs of the Federal capital. 
In addition to recognising the power potential of the Snowy, both Pridham 
and Scrivener saw the possiblity of the river supplying the proposed Fed-
eral capital site at Dalgety with its water requirements.[12j 
These early proposals were extended in the 1920s to include a water 
supply for Sydney and intermediate country towns. In 1926 T W Keele -
a member and former President of the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and 
Drainage Board - investigated the possibility of bringing Snowy water to 
Sydney from a storage dam at Jindabyne by tunnels and pipeline, following 
generally the railway line between Cooma and Sydney, and providing, also, 
for a water supply to Canberra and towns and settlements along the rail-
way as far as Mittagong. Bound up with this proposal was a high-level 
scheme from Cataract Reservoir to deliver water on both sides of Sydney 
Harbour at sufficient pressure to eliminate the pumping of water. 
The above proposal was reviewed in 1927 by 3 G S Purvis - Chief 
Engineer of the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board - but 
remained substantially unaltered with the exception of cost estimates. 
No action was taken by the Board to implement the Keele-Purvis proposals, 
which were finally rejected in favour of the Warragamba schenne, primarily 
on the grounds of comparative costs. Interest in the use of the Snowy 
River for metropolitan water supply was revived during World War II on 
account of prolonged drought conditions in the Sydney water supply catchment 
area and resultant water restrictions. As before, the cost of diverting 
Snowy waters to supply Sydney was generally considered to be the limiting 
factor , and topical interest waned as conditions gradually improved. 
The earliest recorded dual-purpose scheme was contained in Keele's 
original water supply proposal, which included the installation of gener-
ators at the outlet from the planned pressure pipelines near Sydney.[13j 
Although Keele's 1926 scheme was the first dual purpose proposal, 
the idea of power generation and irrigation was not conceptually linked 
until 1937 when R F and C J Harnett proposed a series of power stations 
placed on the Murrumbidgee, into which the Snowy River had been diverted. 
The general idea of the diversion of the Snowy River for more than 
one purpose (i.e. irrigation or power generation or water supply) was 
carried a stage further in 19^0 by R T McKay, for many years a . 
persistent advocate for utilising the waters of the Snowy River in a dual 
capacity, viz., to supplement the flow of the Murrumbidgee River and 
bring a supply to Sydney."(p.6)[l^J 
McKay's agitation for the formulation of a specific public policy 
for the development of the Snowy River was followed in 19^1 by formal 
proposals from the New South Wales Water Conservation and Irrigation 
Commission for the use of Snowy waters for both irrigation and hydro-
electric power. The Commission proposed [15j to divert the Snowy River 
in order to augment the supply of water from Burrinjuck Reservoir for 
the purposes of meeting the increased demand for irrigation water in the 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area, and for further development of the area. 
The irrigation aspects of this proposal involved the divertion of 1 200 cubic 
feet per second from the Snowy to the Murrumbidgee by the construction 
of a dam on the Snowy at Jindabyne, diversion works between 3indabyne 
reservoir and the Murrumbidgee, and a dam on the Murrumbidgee at Billilingera. 
It was also recommended by the Commission that the construction be 
undertaken of auxiliary hydro-electric works with a total generating cap-
acity of 50 000 kilowatts. 
Interest in the development of an appropriate scheme, in whatever 
form, did not suddenly cease at this time, however because of its overall 
concern with the national economy the Commonwealth Government became 
a major party to the considerations of a resource capable of irrigation 
and power generation and which was likely to have impact beyond the 
borders of any one state . 
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THE ROLES OF THE THREE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED 
It was obvious that for various and often conflicting reasons and 
priorities, the New South Wales, Victorian and Federal Governnnents all 
professed keen interest in the waters of the Snowy River.[1J 
When the Australian Constitution was formulated at the turn of the 
century the problems of sufficient and regular water supply were obvious, 
and the electricity industry was in its infancy. The first electricity supply 
undertakings had been established during the late 1800s, primarily to supply 
electric lighting, and by 1900 the use of electricity for industrial power was 
still minimal. In factories in New South Wales for example, the horse-
power of electric motors as a proportion of total horsepower of engines 
and motors was less than one percent.[2j 
It should not be surprising therefore that there is no specific reference 
to electricity or water in the Australian constitution. The control of water 
rested with the States,[3j and the supply of electricity was in all proba-
bility seen as a public sector utility function which, in the Australian 
Federation, rests with the States. 
Whilst neither of these subjects appear in the Australian constitution, 
it does not mean that there was no national interest in respect of them or 
no role for the Commonwealth. Any major industrial activity which demands 
a major share of the country's capital and which, by way of reliability, or 
unreliability, of supply a f fec ts the standard of living of every Australian, 
sooner or later, comes under scrutiny in terms of national interest and 
development. 
The role of the Commonwealth Government in the establishment of 
the Snowy Mountains Authority and therefore of the Scheme can not be 
stressed too highly. That it was in by far the best position to raise the 
money for the construction of the Scheme can not be in doubt, but this 
must be placed in the context of the Commonwealth's initial concerns 
over the issues of post war reconstruction and development. 
The issue of reconstruction went not just to the physical aspects of 
the community but also included the whole complex of social, economic 
and political arrangements. In short from a Government view it had to do 
with the whole aspirations of the community for a better way of life. 
The matters falling under that general heading however may have fallen 
within the competence of the Federal, State or Local Governments or 
semi Government bodies, and with that in mind a Federal Government 
Cabinet sub committee was established to review the progress of reconstruction 
planning and to co-ordinate and direct inter-departmental activities.[^J This 
sub committee comprised the Treasurer (Chifley), Attorney-General (Evatt), 
Minister for Social Security (Holloway), and Minister for Labour (Ward), 
and had the responsibility of examining schemes for reconstruction, plann-
ing, and correlation of all phases of reconstruction prior to making recommend-
ations to Cabinet for the future conduct and direction of reconstruction. 
The conservation and reticulation of water was specifically identified as 
a most important feature of any reconstruction plan.[3j 
Much debate followed the recommendation by the sub committee 
that the Commonwealth be invested with sufficiently wide powers to save 
the nation from the chaos likely to arise if it did not have such powers 
over national reconstruction. This was due in no small part to Member 
of Parliament Menzies' assertions that such proposals were nothing but an 
excuse for a precipitate and premature election. Dr Evatt, the Attorney-
General, replied on behalf of the Government [6j that the assertions had 
no foundation in fact and that the proposals were a genuine at tempt to 
guard against the anarchy and chaos that would threaten the country 
unless reconstruction was dealt with on a national level. In the event, 
the Constitution Alteration (War Aims and Reconstruction) Bill was intro-
duced into Parliament by Dr Evatt on 1 October 19^2, with the comment 
that the postwar problems of employment, housing, health, child welfare, 
vocational training, markets and price stability would require s ta tescraf t 
of a high order [7j which supposedly could only be provided at a Common-
wealth level. 
The debate did not go ahead on the Bill but was referred to a special 
committee comprising eight members of the House of Representatives, 
four from the Senate, (of which half were from the Opposition), plus the 
Premier and Leader of the Opposition from each State Parliament, totall-
ing twenty four. This committee reported to the only Constitutional Con-
vention held since federation which unanimously decided that adequate 
powers should be granted to the Commonwealth for the resett lement of 
soldiers and advancement of their dependants and for the purposes of post 
war reconstruction.[8j Bills were subsequently introduced into each State 
Parliament sponsored by the Leaders of the Government, irrespective of 
party, and were passed. On the 1 January 19^3 the Minister for Post War 
Reconstruction (Chifley) announced the appointment of a Rural Reconstruction 
Commission comprised of politicians and academics whose charter it was 
to: 
. . investigate problems associated with primary industry generally . . . 
to submit specific plans for the rehabilitation of rural industries, for 
such extension or rearrangement of primary industries as may be considered 
necessary, having regard to the markets available or likely to be avail-
able externally and internally in the post war period, and for the 
improvement of conditions of life in the rural areas." (p.35)[9j 
Dr H C Coombs was appointed Director-General of Postwar Recon-
struction on 15 January 19^3. 
Emphasis was placed on the planning for resettlement of servicemen 
and women, and the rehabilitation of primary production, based on potential 
markets available at home and abroad. The aim was to give farmers greater 
stability of income, and to improve efficiency in farming methods so that 
primary industry would become less dependent on subsidies. Secondary 
production capacity which had been greatly extended both in size and tech-
nique because of the requirements of war also needed to be maintained. 
An intensive national works program was seen to have been an important 
part of the Government's plans to satisfy both the primary and secondary 
sector needs. The principal matters under this program were said to be 
". . . water conservation and the extension of electrical facilities." (p.^7) 
[lOj The further development of the supply and distribution of electric 
power in the post war years would greatly assist the range and possibilities 
of regional planning. 
Acknowledging the role that the States had to play in developing 
and advising their more localised programs the Commonwealth established 
the National Works Council at the Premiers' Conference in July 19if3. 
This Council which consisted of representatives of the Commonwealth 
and the States with the Prime Minister as ex officio Chairman had as 
its aim the preparation of a national works program to provide for a smooth 
transition from war to peace time employment and development. The 
first stage of the plan was to provide a reservoir of work to provide immediate 
employment for service personnel returning to civilian life, thus inspiring 
confidence in the commercial and industrial sectors and maintaining the 
momentum of the nation's economy during the transitional period. The 
second and third stages of the plan involved the classification of works 
into priorities, and the concentration on studies effecting proposals for 
long range developmental plans. 
Works projected for the first stage included the improvement of 
country water conservation and irrigation projects to overhaul the drought 
dangers and meet the demands of increased population, to improve the 
sanitation systems, and to develop power and light output because of the 
fact that many of the existing power supply systems had margins too small 
[11J to meet the anticipated needs. 
The Commonwealth Government, based on the requests reaching it 
via the committee apparatus, and other information, decided that input 
from regional advisory bodies would greatly assist their considerations 
for regional development and industrial decentralisation. The views of 
these self interest groups would it was thought add another dimension 
to the planning process. It was through one of these groups, a deputation 
representing a great part of the Murrumbidgee Area, that the proposal 
for the diversion of the Snowy River waters for irrigation and generation 
of electrical power, first formally came to the attention of senior members 
of the Council and of Government in May 19^3. The deputation which 
met Messrs Chifley and Dedman (then Minister for Postwar Reconstruction) 
explained their proposal outlining that the cost would be in the order of 
L13 million. Neither Chifley nor Dedman appeared to place much merit 
on the proposal, with Dedman pointing out the essential involvement of 
the Victoria Government and the difficulty of formal agreements between 
the States, and Chifley suggesting that there were a great many things 
to do, with limited finance available.[12j In any event such a proposal 
required consultation amongst the States and the determination of problems 
and priorities. 
Whilst the Commonwealth appeared to be paying little attention 
to these proposals, the New South Wales Government by contrast had been 
taking a most active interest with Victoria being interested but not as 
active. One of the many proposals which had been put forward for NSW 
consideration was for the use of the Snowy River (and which has been 
described in more detail in Chapter 2) was the dual-purpose power gener-
ation and irrigation proposal of R T McKay in 19^0.[13J McKay's agitation 
for the formulation of a specific public policy for the development of the 
Snowy River was followed in 19^1 by formal proposals from the New South 
Wales Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission for the use of Snowy 
waters for both irrigation and hydro-electric power. This continued interest 
led to the establishment by the NSW Government in 19^2 of the Snowy 
River Investigation Committee under the chairmanship of the State Director 
of Public Works, 3 M Main, to investigate and report on proposals for the 
utilisation of the waters of the Snowy River. 
The result of this investigation and study of the engineering proposals 
for the utilisation of the waters of the Snowy River produced a develop-
mental report heavily biased [l^J on the side of New South Wales interests, 
especially for irrigation, at the expense of the Victoria Government's 
interests, especially in power generation. These findings were vigorously 
opposed by local interest groups in southeastern New South Wales and 
in Victoria who had been agitating for a hydro-electric scheme to promote 
the industrial development of the Monaro, Far South Coast and Gippsland. 
The Victorian Government was not as protectionist in its considera-
tion of the uses of the Snowy River though the State Electricity Commission 
of Victoria had surveyed the river and selected several possible sites for 
dams and power stations. The Victorian Government's position could best 
be summed up by the Chairman of the Victorian State Rivers and Water 
Supply Commission who suggested in 19^1 that: 
". . . . the development of the Snowy River Basin might be undertaken 
by a separate Authority comprising representatives of the Commonwealth 
and the two States concerned. A precedent for such action already 
exists in the River Murray Commission which has so satisfactorily 
handled the problems of the development and utilisation of the River 
Murray waters. . ." (p.98)[15j 
It was about this time that the absence of appropriate multi-lateral 
agreements between the three interested governments became obvious.[16j 
The Commonwealth Government in addition to its general role as guardian 
of the national interest (including defense), had the legal right to use Snowy 
water for the provision of electric light and power for the Australian Capital 
Territory. The diversion of the Snowy River waters for use in New South 
Wales, as recommended by the Snowy River Investigation Committee, would 
deprive Victoria of those waters and could well raise complex legal problems 
concerning s tate riperian rights. Indeed the Victorian Government was 
by no means an indifferent observer of New South Wales proposals, having 
considered over the years various proposals for the development of the 
Snowy in the interests of power generation, irrigation, flood control, and 
water supply for its own State needs. 
Following the recommendations of the Snowy River Investigation 
Committee[17j which implied that the large scale use of Snowy waters 
was a national rather than Regional issue, the Premier of New South Wales 
(the Hon. W 3 McKell) wrote to Prime Minister Chifley on 5 September 
19^5 requesting the Commonwealth surrender its right to use Snowy River 
waters on the basis that New South Wales wanted it for irrigation purposes. 
At about the same time the Victorian Premier, Hon. 3 Cain, suggested 
as an alternative proposal that the diversion should be used to provide a 
considerable amount of electric power, whilst allowing the waters to still 
be available for irrigation purposes. 
In the light of these conflicting views the Minister for Postwar 
Reconstruction, Mr Dedman, announced that a conference of Ministers 
representing the Commonwealth, New South Wales, and Victorian Govern-
ments was being planned to consider utilisation of the Snowy river waters. 
The Commonwealth's main concern was that: 
". . . in view of Australia's limited water resources the final decision 
the use of the River would ensure the maximum benefit for Australia 
generally ."(pp.21 -22)[ 18J 
The f i rs t conference took place on 25 and 26 June 19^6 a f t e r a 
meeting of the Loan Council. As expected the New South Wales and 
Victorian Governments maintained their respective positions with regard 
to water utilisation and in the case of Victoria, power generation as well. 
The Commonwealth Government 's position was that it had a moral obligation 
to ensure tha t legal (riperian) rights were maintained and that because 
the Commonwealth Department of Postwar Reconstruction had commenced 
a review of the potential i t ies of the various proposals for diversion of 
the Snowy, the States should take no fur ther action at that t ime. As a 
result of this meeting it was agreed that the Commonwealth carry out 
a preliminary investigation over the ensuing six months in relation to the 
proposals of the two States,[19j irrigation in the Murrumbidgee as opposed 
to power generation and irrigation in the Murray. 
The subsequent investigation was conducted along two separate but 
related lines of enquiry. One was directed to ascertain the practicabili ty 
of building the requisite tunnels and storages and the costs involved, whilst 
the other was to assess the agricultural advantages inherent in the two 
schemes. In view of the fac t that the h ydro-electric power which would 
be available from either diversion was directly related to the type and 
design of the diversion works, issues relating to the quantity of power 
and its value were refer red to a special engineering section of the inquiry 
which was led by the Director-General of the then Commonwealth Depart-
ment of Works and Housing, Dr L F Loder, with the assistance of the water 
conservation, e lectr ic i ty and public works authorit ies of both New South 
Wales and Victoria and the Com nn on wealth Army Survey Corps. This 
investigation concluded [20] tha t the proposal to divert the Snowy into 
the Murray was both pract ical and economical and that in view of the 
power potential of the Snowy and the urgent need for New South Wales 
and Victoria to plan for fu ture power at an early date, that the mat te r 
be fur ther investigated as soon as possible. 
The agricultural and pastoral aspects were examined by an Economic 
Investigating Commit tee of six Commonwealth off icers directed by the 
then Director-General of the Commonwealth Department of Post-War 
Reconstruction, Dr H C Coombs. This Commit tee with the assistance of 
the CSIRO's Division of Soils, sought information, advice and representa-
tions from all levels of State and Local Government and from individuals 
likely to be a f f ec t ed by either proposal. In trying to determine the relat ive 
meri ts of the two schemes, the sometimes conflicting cr i ter ia [21j examined 
included physical practicabil i ty, economy in the distribution of water , costs 
and returns, developments in production, and stabilisation of rural industry. 
The Commit tee finally concluded tha t from an agricultural point of view, 
diversion to the Murrumbidgee provided a bet ter agricultural solution than 
did diversion to the Murray. An important qualification to this s ta tement 
however was tha t whether greater benefi ts actually accrued depended 
on the policy on subsequent use as determined by the New South Wales 
Government. It was also pointed out by the Commit tee tha t should a 
decision be made in favour of the diversion to the Murray, e f fec t ive use 
could still be made of these waters for irrigation purposes, though with 
less national advantage agriculturally.[22j 
¿fO 
A joint report [23j based on these two investigations was subsequently 
prepared and established a prima fac ie case for the complete investigation 
of the proposal to divert the Snowy into the Murray, including the proposal 
to divert some or all of the water back from the Murray to the Murrumbidgee 
valley. 
On 15 August 19^7 the Federal Minister for Works (Lemmon) released 
the report \2k] on the diversion of the Snowy River which commented 
tha t the exploitation of the full potentiali t ies of Snowy River would not 
only overcome the shortages of power existing in New South Wales and 
Victoria but would ensure adequate supply for fu ture industrial development, 
as well as extending the existing irrigation systems. This unique national 
asset \25] when developed to its full potential would provide irrigation for 
300 000 acres with a gross annual return in the value of foodstuffs of at 
least LIO 000 000 p.a., as well as some 750 000 horsepower. If the diversion 
went direct to the Murrumbidgee it would provide the same irrigation 
capaci ty but 300 000 horsepower less, which equated to 1,300,000 additional 
tons of coal to be used annually. Profi t was expected to run at 8%, providing 
a higher yield than tha t shown by similar schemes run by utility companies 
overseas.[26j 
As a result of these reports the second conference of Commonwealth 
and Sta te Ministers decided to establish a commit tee under the Chairmanship 
of Dr L F Loder and consisting of two representat ives from the Commonwealth 
and two each from New South Wales and Victoria with power to co-opt 
f rom the relevant Authorities, to make a complete detailed investigation, 
and to report to the Premiers ' Conference by August 19^8. This commi t tee 
(the Snowy River Commit tee) did report back [27] following a comprehensive 
survey of the resources of the Snowy River mountains area which included 
aerial and field surveys, tes t bores and fur ther s t ream gaugings, and concluded 
tha t neither of the original proposals provided a sat isfactory solution to 
the use of the waters f rom the whole area . Instead the Commit tee pro-
posed tha t in addition to the Snowy River, the Upper Murrumbidgee, Tumut 
and Tooma Rivers be utilised to produce some 1 750 000 kilowatts. This 
was 60 000 kilowatts more than the consumption of Sydney and Melbourne 
combined at the t ime, and would save an est imated ^ 600 000 tons of 
coal a year whilst still providing water for irrigation.[28j 
The report was sent to the relevant States Premiers and Ministers 
in November 19^8 and on 9 January 19^9 Prime Minister Chifley announced 
[29J tha t even though the Report 's recommendations were still being considered 
by the Governments, the proposals were of such magnitude and national 
in teres t that they should be made public. The speech, designed to f i re 
the imagination of the population and inspire confidence in the post war 
economy emphasised the magnitude in increase in both power generation 
and water for irrigation, the saving of limited coal resources, decentralis-
ation of industry away from the major population centres, and the safe ty 
of such a scheme from enemy a t t ack . He described a scheme: 
. . so vast and so beneficial is a national scheme in the fullest sense 
of the word. It would be one of the greates t projects in the history 
of Australia 's development and I hope the Governments concerned 
will soon give consideration to it." (pp. 31-32) [30j 
It should be remembered that during this time the Commonwealth 
Government was also assessing the viability of establishing other industries 
in country and remote areas. The Northern Australian Development Committee 
involved Commonwealth resources in the investigation of soils, pastures, and 
the geology of the northern regions of Australia. Other investigations 
included the Ord River Scheme, the Katherine Research Station and the 
pearling industry. 
The Report of the Snowy River Committee was considered at the 
third conference of Ministers representing the Commonwealth, New South 
Wales and Victoria, held in Canberra on February 19^9. This conference 
approved the recommendations of the committee regarding the diversion 
of the flows of the Eucumbene and Tooma Rivers to the Tumut River 
with compensatory flow from the Snowy to the Murray River. In addition 
to this it directed the committee to further consider the utilisation of 
the balance of Snowy River waters and distribution of electric power between 
the States (once the requirements of the Commonwealth for defense and 
the ACT were met), and report back to the next Ministers' Conference 
on 30 3une 19^9. 
It is interesting to note that the Commonwealth's intentions with 
regard to the development of the Scheme became clear when it was announced 
[31J on 12 May 19^9 that Federal Cabinet had approved matters affecting 
the drafting of the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Power Bill, and further 
that the Bill was to be introduced during those sittings of the Parliament. 
The Scheme was again described as: 
" . . the greatest single project in our history. It is a plan for the whole 
nation, belonging to no one State nor to any group or section. It is a 
two-sided plan, because it provides not only for the provision of vast 
supplies of new power but also for an innnnense decentralisation of 
industry and population. This is a plan for the nation, and it needs 
the nation to back it." (pp. 13-l^)[32j 
The Bill was introduced to the Commonwealth Parliament on 26 May 
19^f9 by Minister for Works Lemmon, who said: 
"The purpose of this bill is to set up the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric 
Authority under the defense powers of the Commonwealth. Defense 
plans are divided into four categories - regional security, the defence 
forces, defence research, and finally the industrial capacity of the 
nation to support a defence machine. It is to the latter two aspects 
that this bill has its greatest application, for it proposes to harness a 
potential power of 1,720,000 kilowatts of hydro-electric power."(p.35)[33j 
It was acknowledged in the speech to the Bill that final plans had not 
been decided on for the final third of the project but that the net result of 
the proposals would result in a power output roughly equivalent to the total 
production of all power stations operating in Australia at that time. More-
over the cost of power was about half that of conventionally produced 
power and given this and the supply of water it was not unrealistic to 
expect large inland cities to develop. Also contained in the speech was 
a reference [3^J to the Authority giving consideration to the engagement 
of contractors from other parts of the world who had skilled teams capable 
of carrying out some of the construction work as well as its own day labour 
forces. The Bill was passed on 26 May 19^9. 
The second investigation [35] by the Snowy River Comnnittee re-
commended that the balance of the Snowy River flow at Jindabyne be 
diverted to the Murray, that irrigation interests be safeguarded, that an 
agreement be reached between the three Governments regarding the 
apportionment of water, and that a f te r deduction of the Commonwealth's 
requirements power be shared between New South Wales and Victoria on 
the ratio of two thirds to one third. These recommendations were adopted 
at the fourth conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers in July 
19^9 where it was also agreed that the costs involved be met initially 
by Commonwealth funds, since it was the only body capable of financing 
such a scheme with repayment over a period of seventy years through 
the sale of electric power to the State Electricity Commissions. In essence 
the cost of irrigation was nil, as the cost of supplying irrigation water 
was to be met by increased tar i f fs for the supply of power. 
As a result of the adoption of the recommendations an advisory 
commit tee was established to advise on the co-ordination of the Scheme 
with developments by the States for the use of the waters diverted and 
for the transmission, distribution, and use of the share of electric power 
made available to the States. This Committee did not actually operate 
until some years later (1953), and then only on an interim basis until the 
agreements were finalised and the Snowy Mountains Council came into 
being in 1959. 
The path to resolution of the issues and agreement to construct 
the Scheme was not a smooth one. It was obvious that blocks of interest 
existed at all levels within the various Governments and in the particular 
regions. It was only through the mechanisms of the State that the momentum 
and forces were channelled into a fornn which was capable of success on 
a national level. 
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THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
As previously mentioned the various governments closely associated 
with the Snowy Scheme had taken advantage of specialist advice gained 
from both overseas investigations and consultants coming to Australia. 
Young nations traditionally rely to an extent on their more technically 
and economically developed allies to assist in the provision of solutions 
to development problems. In addition to existing techniques and experience, 
cultural and political factors, geographical similarity which often gives 
rise to common economic problems and solutions, was a major factor in 
determining where Australia sought overseas assistance. This is exempli-
fied by Deakin's 188^f investigations, when as Chairman of a Victorian 
Royal Commission, he investigated irrigation schemes and practices in 
India, Egypt, Italy and America. He was glowing in his reports about what 
he saw in America but far from enthusiastic about what he saw and learned 
in Europe.[lJ The principal result of Deakin's visits were the Irrigation Act 
of 1886 which subsequently formed the basis of much of Australia's irriga-
tion development, and the agreement between the Victorian Government 
and the Chaffey brothers for the establishment of an irrigation settlement 
at Mildura which proved beyond doubt the feasibility of successful irrigation 
agriculture in Australia. [2j Others too were impressed with developments 
in the United States. [3J 
The history of water development in the U.S.A., particularly in the 
17 Irrigation States, showed utilisation of the nation's water resources 
on behalf of its rapidly increasing population, with particular emphasis on 
power and irrigation benefits, integrated to give optimum national gain. 
The first Reclamation Act, passed by Congress in 1902, authorised 
¿f9 
the use of Federal funds received from the sale of public lands for the 
survey, construction and maintenance of irrigation works, and provided 
for payment of construction charges, without interest, by the beneficiaries 
of a project. This Act also authorised the establishment of the Bureau of 
Reclamation. 
During the initial stages of reclamation the purpose was to provide 
water for irrigation, little or no regard being paid to other benefits. However, 
recognition of reclamation as a multi-purpose operation with hydro-electric 
as well as irrigation benefits was marked by the construction of Roosevelt 
Dam on the Salt River in Arizona, completed in 1911. Revenues from 
the lease of power privileges for the sale of energy were directed to be 
credited to the cost of the power plant and to other aspects of the project, 
thus establishing a basic concept - the use of power revenues to pay the 
overall project costs, [^j 
Prior to the construction of Roosevelt Dam the Salt River Valley 
was an arid wasteland, suitable at best and only in small parts for grazing. 
Between 1910 and 1950 irrigation acreage increased from 15,000 to 300,000; 
population from 2^,000 to 330,000; farm revenues from $6 m. to $81 m; 
and power revenue from $^f6,000 to over $8 m. Bank deposits increased 
during the same period from $5 m. to $2^5 m.[5j 
The Salt River Project was built by the Bureau of Reclamation on 
behalf of the Salt River Valley Water Users Association. It should be 
noted however that the operation of the project remained in the hands 
of the Water Users' Association and not the Bureau of Reclamation as 
an agency of the Federal Government. The first truly multi-purpose 
development which was authorised by Congress to be built and operated 
by the Bureau of Reclamation was the Boulder Canyon Project. This work 
was constructed under the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, and provided 
for the disposal of project produced hydro-electric power to repay the 
cost of project facilities allotted to the power purposes, and thereafter 
to repay the cost of irrigation, water storeage and flood control. 
In 1939 Reclamation Law was further adjusted to emphasise the 
importance of power and of municipal water supplies in determining project 
feasibility. A provision was included to the e f fec t that those portions 
of the project cost allocated to the purposes of navigation and flood control 
were in the national interest and need not be repaid. Later legislation 
provided for the conservation of fish and wild-life resources on Reclamation 
projects and recognised such costs as non reimbursible. [6j 
In 19^^ Congress authorised the development of the Missouri River 
Basin in the States of Kansas, Nebraska, North and South Dakota, Montana 
and Wyoming (known in the 1930's as America's dust bowl), with the following 
priorities attaching to its water resources: 
1 that flood control dams be built on the main stream, and tributaries 
and soil conservation measures be applied throughout the catchment 
area. 
2 that hydro-electric plants be installed where feasible and practical 
to provide power for industries, municipalities and farm houses 
in the immediate areas; to intertie with transmission systems 
to the east and west; and thus provide revenue for repayment, 
with interest, of the hydro-electric facilities, and to assist in 
repayment of associated irrigation projects. 
3 that irrigation projects be constructed, where water supply and 
storeage facilities are adequate, for long-range agricultural stability.[7j 
Whilst not without its early failures, U.S. achievements demonstrated 
according to Hudson [8J that well-planned multi purpose water resource 
development was, as a rule, sound financial policy, even though on the 
basis of the direct revenue, other than from the sale of power, such projects 
might appear totally uneconomic. An example of 15 reclamation projects 
constructed in the U.S.A. between 1916 and 1953, and collectively costing 
$269 m, showed that for the year 1953 individual income taxes paid by 
irrigation farmers and others whose employment directly stemmed from 
the developments amounted to $106 m. The estimated cumulative income 
tax revenues from the project areas since 1916 amounted to $800 m. [9j 
In addition, an estimate of the appropriate share of corporate and excise 
tax revenues collected in and directly attributable to the developments 
was $500 m. Thus, between 1916 and 1953, by making an investment of 
$269 m, the Federal Government collected, mainly from immediate bene-
ficiaries, $1300 m, not counting direct payment of project costs by water 
and power users, i .e. taxes collected amounted to about five times the 
investment. 
These developments and practices from America were closely monitored 
by a number of countries including Australia as a result of their engineering 
and subsequent related economic achievements. 
As far as the Snowy Mountains Scheme was concerned, the first 
formal contact between the two countries came from a meeting between 
officers of the Department of External Affairs at the Australian Embassy 
in Washington and officials of US State and Interior Departnnents on 29 
March 19^9. [lOj At that meeting the 'Snowy River Diversion' project 
and benefits accruing from the expansion of irrigation systems and power 
development especially economic and defence aspects were outlined. The 
approach was ". . . accorded a most cordial welcome." [11J and the Australian 
representatives were confident that the U.S. administration would be able 
to assist with furnishing technical advice and services of Government experts 
under Public Law ^02 (Smith - Mündt Act)[12j, though this was by no means 
certain at that time. 
The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act 19^8 
(or the Smith-Mundt Act - Public Law 402) had as its objectives: to enable 
the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding 
of the U.S. in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between 
people of the U.S.A. and . . . other countries. Among the means to be 
used in achieving these objectives were: 
(i) An information service to disseminate abroad information about 
the United States of America. 
(ii) An education exchange service to co-operate with other nations in: 
(a) interchange of persons, knowledge and skills 
(b) the rendering of technical and other services 
(c) the interchange of developments in the field 
of education, the arts, the sciences.[13j 
A note of caution was injected at that time when the Department 
of External Affairs advised the Australian Embassy that Australia would 
not require U.S.A. to provide an overall service nor a comprehensive check 
on plans but rather it would appreciate advice on particular technical problems 
especially in connection with long tunnels of major dimensions through 
rock. The principal type of expert assistance required was said to be from 
construction engineers with experience in the use of modern plant for 
the construction of dams and tunnels and in the installation of machinery 
required for the development of hydro-electric power. [l^J At the same 
t ime it was foreshadowed that a f ter the legislation was passed in May, 
the head of the Authority would visit the U.S.A. and relevant U.S.B.R. 
experts would be invited to come to Australia for viewing the Scheme 
and to tender advice. 
Contact was maintained with the U.S.A. Government and Department 
of Interior which included "a loan" [15j of Mr Dexheimer, Assistant Chief 
Construction Engineer of the U.S.B.R. for three months from November 
1950 to look at tunnelling problems on site. This visit was arranged between 
Commissioner Hudson of the SMA and Dr S L Savage, a Consulting Engineer 
in Denver, and a past officer of the U.S.B.R. who acted on behalf of the 
Authority with the Bureau of Reclamation. [16J At the same time it was 
foreshadowed that SMA may require 2 or 3 specialist engineers on a loan 
basis to help the Chief Investigation Engineer on "intricate problems".[17j 
Dr Savage suggested that the Australian Foreign Office should make 
a request to the U.S. State Department to obtain the services of Engineers 
[18J, and whilst on a trip to Australia in October 1950 suggested that the 
Bureau of Reclamation would probably be prepared to employ approximately 
3 "bright young engineers" [19j in their Denver office to gain experience 
in the Bureau of Reclamation's methods, a suggestion which was 
enthusiastically received by Hudson.[20j 
On 20 March 1951 Hudson wrote to Minister for National Develop-
nnent Casey, suggesting that the Bureau of Reclamation could undertake 
certain design work for the Authority under the provisions of US Public 
Law ^02. In the sanne letter Hudson stated that the best way the Bureau 
of Reclannation could assist would be to undertake the design of the Upper 
Tumut group of works from the upstream portal of the Adaminaby-Tumut 
tunnel to the tailrace of the second power station on the Upper Tumut 
River, including the Tooma-Tumut tunnel. The designs would be based 
on technical data furnished by the Authority and would be taken to the 
stage of compilation of specifications and contract drawings for letting 
the work by contract . He estimated, in a very approximate way, that 
the amount required for these services would be possibly $230 000. [21J 
This suggestion was further reinforced by reliance on the argument 
of national defence [22J, the premier reason used in the Government arguments 
supporting construction of the Scheme. [23J Hudson outlined that the 
construction program provided for completion of the Upper Tumut works 
excluding Tumut 2 within 8-9 years, thus providing an additional 250,000kW 
with T2 two years later adding another 230,000 kW. He argued that as 
an urgent defence measure the adoption of unorthodox methods including 
placing overseas contracts could mean the completion of all Upper Tumut 
works within 6 years. He further pointed out that power demand in combatant 
countries increased by approximately 30% during the early stages of world 
war 2 and that if war occurred within a few years, Australia could not 
meet demands for increased power unless steps were taken immediately 
to augment generating capacity over and above that planned by States.[2^J 
Minister Casey accepted the argument and agreed that the use of 
the U.S.B.R. would enable the Snowy to go ahead much faster on the design 
side and make it unnecessary to employ high level design staff in high 
numbers. [25] 
At a meeting of Cabinet sub-committee empowered to commit the 
Cabinet, comprising Messrs Fadden (Treasurer), Spender (External Affairs) 
and Casey (National Development) and Senator O'Sullivan (Trade <5c Customs), 
it was agreed to accept the opportunity to use U.S.B.R. s taf f , that arrange-
ments would be made by Minister Casey through the appropriate diplomatic 
channels, and that the decision involved no prejudgement of the extent to 
which any of the Snowy works were to be proceeded. [26j (Such work 
was estimated to not exceed $250 000 or 1112.000). 
Discussions continued with the US Department of State and U.S.B.R, 
where it was finally agreed that Section ^02 of Public Law ^02 (Smith-Mundt 
Act) gave authority but that to get around Section ^03 which held that the 
State could not enter into performance of services to a foreign govern-
ment where such services may be performed adequately by qualified private 
American individuals and agencies, the project should be given a training 
slant in accordance with the basic objectives of Public Law ^02, viz. 
information and educational exchange. [27] 
The Australian reply [28J that the SMA would send up to 12 engineers 
for training and Commissioner or Associate Commissioner with full authority 
to enter into commitments were to travel to Denver, and that a senior 
Authority engineer would also go to the United States to act as Liaison 
Engineer, was unnecessary, however, as further discussions confirmed that 
adequate s ta tu tory authority existed to enable the U.S.A. to undertake 
the service to the Scheme without the necessity to emphasise training.[29j 
Following this, Associate Commissioner Lang proceeded to the U.S.A. 
on 27 May 1931. In the course of his negotiations with USBR he found 
tha t the defence significance of the Snowy Mountains development as a 
source of power for industry and irrigation water for food production was 
of considerable interest to the U.S. authorities.[19J It is not surprising 
the re fo re tha t the defence aspect was mentioned in the preamble to the 
Agreement (with the U.S.B.R.) in the same terms as used in the SMHE 
Power Act 19^9. It is important to note that Lang also recognised and 
claimed tha t the services of the U.S.B.R. could be a decisive fac tor not 
only in expediting the early works for production of hydro-electric power 
and water for irrigation but also in developing an ef f ic ien t organisation 
to carry out the balance of the works. [30] 
In collaboration with the Australian Embassy, Lang conducted the 
negotiat ions and submitted a Draf t Agreement and Report on the Agreement 
to the Australian Ambassador who subsequently wrote to the Prime Minister 
on 22 August expressing sat isfact ion with the Report and with the conclusions 
reached . [31J 
Whilst the Draf t Agreement was expressed in fairly general terms 
it was obvious tha t the final stages of the negotiations between the US 
Authorit ies and Mr Lang envisaged the adoption of a much more extensive 
and costly program than had been contemplated. Both the Agreement 
and the Report covered technical training and technical assistance and 
whilst the Technical Training section presented no real concerns to the 
Authority, the Technical Assistance section was not as clear cut . The 
Report in dealing with technical assistance submitted three a l ternat ive 
schemes [32J: 
Scheme A, in which the Bureau was to carry out all design and specif ica-
tion work which it can undertake including designs and specifications 
for power station equipment such as turbines, generators and t ransformers 
and appurtenant plant and equipment (estimated cost $3,886,000 
or LI,750,000) 
Scheme B, in which the Bureau was to carry out all design and speci-
f icat ion work which it can undertake for civil engineering works 
leaving the Authority to carry out the design and specification work 
for power station equipment (estimated cost $2,086,000 or L939,000), 
and 
Scheme C, the same as Scheme B except that the Bureau would 
proceed only to the stage where construction tenders are called 
(est imated cost $1,^00,000 or t630,000) 
The es t imated costs, it should be remembered, were based on the 
f ac t tha t a unit of work in Australia costing LI would cost $5 in America. 
This cost disparity, coupled with the fac t that the Authority has been 
successful in recruiting some Norwegian Engineers who were experienced 
in the design and execution of deep pressure shafts , was suff icient for 
Hudson to recommend that a modified Scheme C be adopted as the Authority 's 
prefer red position. [34j The tota l es t imated cost for both Technical Training 
and Assistance total led $880 000. 
This recommendation was subsequently contained and supported in 
Minister Spooner's le t ter to the Prime Minister Menzies. [35j 
The Agreement was concluded by an exchange of notes between 
Ambassador Spender and Mr James E Webb, Acting Secretary of State 
and by the signature of an agreement concerning policies and procedures 
for the contemplated program by Mr T A Lang, Associate Commissioner, 
SMA, and Mr Goodrich W Lineweaver, Acting Commissioner of the Bureau 
of Reclamation. The Agreement provided that the Bureau of Reclamation 
would make available expert advice, services and training for Australian 
engineers who would not only study American projects and engineering 
practice but also co-operate with the Bureau in the production of designs 
and specifications for portion of the Snowy Mountains works. [36j 
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File G271(l) - SMA file - Agreement Between the Commonwealth of 
Australia and the United States of America for Technical 
Training and Technical Assistance - Policy. (Part 1). 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE UNITED STATES 
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION IN AMERICA 
The agreement that the USBR would make available expert assistance 
primarily took the form of design and specification assistance for that 
portion of the Scheme known as the Upper Tumut works, the completion 
of which was as important for the yielding of early results as it was for 
the laying of foundations for water control to allow the Lower Tumut 
sections of the Scheme to be built later. 
The fact that the USBR was requested to undertake a modified 
"Scheme C", all civil engineering design and specification work to the 
stage where construction tenders were called, recognised that, notwithstanding 
the nationalistic arguments of Wootten[lJ that there were sufficient qualified 
engineers in Australia and to not use them was to demonstrate a sense 
of inferiority, there simply were insufficient numbers of trained and skilled 
personnel available to the Authority at that time. This lack of resources 
was not capable of being redressed within the t imeframes set for the project 's 
completion by the Government, either by the importation of suitably skilled 
people or the training of existing s taf f . Each of these issues, use of Australian 
engineers, immigration and training were addressed within the life of the 
project and each contributed significantly to the successful completion 
of the total Scheme. The limiting of the USBR to this role also meant 
that as more Authority engineers reached the standard of efficiency required 
and experience gained, they could progressively take over the work for 
other Scheme projects, building on the foundations laid by virtue of the 
technical assistance provided by the USBR. 
In addition to the resources question it was clear that the USBR 
possessed and held in Denver the technology that was required for the 
construction of the Scheme. This was stored in its people, its docunnentation, 
and its work nnethods and practices. The USBR had the experience, expertise 
and the capacity to assist. 
By the early 1950s the USBR had achieved a significant reputation 
worldwide for its engineering achievennents, including engineering design 
and supervision of construction, particularly involving structures of large 
size and complexity. These achievements included bridges, canals and open 
channel systems, dams, communications, earth structures, foundations, 
flood control, pipelines, highways, power generation transmission and distri-
bution, surveying and mapping, tunnels and water systems. In the f i f ty 
year history up to 1950 its engineering achievements included the Hoover 
Dam (highest dam), Grand Coulee Dam (largest concrete dam), Shasta 
Dam (second highest dam), Anderson Ranch Dam (highest earthfill dam), 
Friant-Kern Canal (longest irrigation canal). Grand Coulee Feeder Canal 
(largest irrigation canal), All-American Canal System (longest integrated 
canal system in operation), Alva B. Adams Tunnel (longest irrigation tunnel), 
Grand Coulee Power Plant (largest hydro-electric power plant), and Grand 
Coulee Pumping Plant (largest pumping plant).[2j 
As a result of its reputation in the field of design and construction 
of structures of unprecedented size and complexity, the Bureau of Reclamation 
had during the period to 1930 assisted private engineering firms, s tate 
and local government agencies, and the departments of Government in 
their engineering undertakings. In general this technical assistance consisted 
of consulting services on basic designs, preparation of designs and specifications 
for structures, and laboratory research. Some examples of this work included 
studies, planning, preparation of designs, specifications and construction 
drawings, and technical assistance for construction of Falcon Dam, a 
13,000,000 cubic yard earthfill structure on the Rio Grande between the 
United States and Mexico, for the International Boundary and Water 
Commission; tests of samples of Barite aggregate for concrete, and tests 
of drill samples at Eniwetok Proving Grounds for the Atomic Energy 
Commission; hydraulic model tests for flood protective works at Morrison, 
Colorado for the US Department of the Army; basic research in the 
development of lightweight concrete for the Housing and Home Finance 
Agency; design of Madden Dam and Power Plant for the Panama canal; 
and design of Norris and Wheeler Dams and Power Plants for the Tennessee 
Valley Authority.[3j 
In addition to these projects the USBR provided assistance to foreign 
countries in various fields of water resource use and developments including 
irrigation, hydro electric power, drainage and comprehensive basin develop-
ments. These included preparation of designs and estimates for Yangtze 
Dam, power plant and navigation facilities, Yangtze River Basin for the 
Republic of China; trial load and stability analysis of the proposed 780 
foot high concrete Kosi Dam for the Central Water Power, Irrigation and 
Navigation Commission, Government of India; testing of Australian-made 
cement in connection with construction of the Warragamba Dam for the 
Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board of New South Wales; 
and embankment material tests for Hirakud Dam, India, and Gal Oya 
Dam, Ceylon, for the International Engineering Company.[^J 
On the 1 February 1931, there were at the Reclamation Engineering 
Centre 780 engineers in the following specialities: Civil, mechanical, electrical, 
electronics, materials, safety, structural, hydraulic, construction, chemical, 
production and programs, architectural, and general. Other specialists 
included chemists and petrographers, geologists, hydrometeorologists, inspectors, 
physicists, geophysicists, architects and technical illustrators. 
Engineering expertise is usually not only a product of experience 
but also of the availability of facilities where research and development 
can be undertaken. In this latter respect the Reclamation Engineering 
Centre in Denver facilitated the resolution of many complex design problems 
by the Bureau engineers and designers. One example of this equipment 
was the A-C network analyzer used by the electrical engineers to study 
in miniature the planning, design and operating problems of complex power 
systems. The characteristics of the electric power system to be studied 
were simulated by appropriate values of resistance, reactance, and capacitance 
on the units making up the analyzer. In a complex electrical network 
many quantities are difficult if not impossible to determine by mathematical 
calculations. The network analyzer reduced the unknowns and allowed 
engineers to determine much more closely the actual needs of the proposed 
power system. In the design of new power systems, which was one of the 
many uses of the analyzer, the Bureau had accomplished savings of many 
hundreds of thousands of dollars by the elimination of transmission line 
sections and closer design of other equipment over that which would have 
been thought necessary with ordinary planning methods.[5j 
Another facility used directly in design was the photoelastic laboratory 
where the most modern photoelastic and analogy apparatus of that time 
was available for use in solving a wide variety of design problems. Photoelastic 
and analogy methods are very useful when analytical solutions to design 
problems are too time-consuming or are extremely difficult. Equipment 
available included the photoelastic polariscope, Babinet compensator, and 
photoelastic interfrometer for studies of stresses in two-dimensional structural 
models; the scatter polariscope and electric ovens for studying stresses 
in three-dimensional models; the Beggs deformeter for studying statically 
indeterminate structures of the f rame type; and the electric analogy tray 
and membrane analogy for studying a wide variety of problems involving 
steady-state potential flow and hydrodynamic ef fec ts of earthquakes amongst 
other things. Also available was an earthquake analyzer for subjecting 
a structure (represented by a torsional pendulum with similar elasticity 
characteristics) to known recorded earthquakes. A reflex integraph was 
available for solving complicated differential equations accurately and 
rapidly.[6j 
In engineering choice [7j there evolves a norm or range of best practices 
that serves as a guide to the replication of technology under similar circum-
stances. It was these practices and techniques that the Authority looked 
for assistance in planning and constructing the Upper Tumut section of 
the Scheme. 
The minimum program for technical assistance services was initially 
to comprise design and specification work to a stage where contract bids 
could be called for the Adaminaby-Tumut Pond Tunnel (including access 
adits and shafts, portals and control works), Tumut Pond Dam, and the 
tunnel from Tumut Pond to the surge tank (including intake portal, surge 
tank and access adit). 
In accordance with the provisions of Section ^ of the Agreement, 
the Authority forwarded prelinninary infornriation regarding field data and 
results of investigations relating to the projects the Bureau was to carry 
out. These included extracts from the surveying and plan catalogue relating 
to the Upper Tumut River and Adaminaby areas, contour plans of the dam 
site and saddles adjacent to the dam site, river cross sections, tunnel portal 
site survey, Tumut Pond dam site surveys, T1 site and Tumut River downsteam 
survey, T1 Power Station contour plan, Tumut Pond Catchment contour, 
contour plan T1 and Tumut River Downstream, Adaminaby Storeage Area 
contour plan, topographic maps of the Kiandra and Snowy Plains areas, 
and Tumut Pond and T1 triangulation diagram. These were complemented 
by aerial photographs of the Tumut Valley below Tumut Pond, upstream 
of Tumut Pond to Power Station T1 site, and the tunnel line Adaminaby 
to Tumut Pond. Reports included a summary of the Adaminaby-Tl Project 
investigations including a general description of the Scheme, a discussion 
of the suggested construction layout for the Adaminaby-Tumut Pond Tunnel, 
preliminary report of the geological investigations for the T1 Project, 
estimates of flood flow and general hydrological information, climatological 
information, a survey of sources of sand and concrete aggregate within 
the Adaminaby-Tl area, and importantly approximate unit rates for estimating 
as at November 1951. Capacity curves for both the Adaminaby Dam and 
Tumut Pond were also sent. [8J 
This information was reviewed by the Chief Engineer of the Bureau 
and his staff who indicated that although the information supplied was 
a general indication of conditions for the works under consideration, it 
was inadequate as a basis for the accurate preparation of designs and speci-
fications suitable for contract bids. It was thus considered desirable for 
selected Bureau personnel to proceed to Australia at an early date in order 
to confer with the Authority on the work to be carried out by the Bureau 
and to assist in the planning and compilation of investigation data and 
the carrying out of investigations for this work. Bureau representatives, 
it was suggested, should include officers skilled in construction material 
investigation and engineering geology, dam investigations and design, and 
tunnel investigation and designs. The most convenient arrangement was 
for the Bureau to send a senior officer of wide experience able to co-ordinate 
and control the activities of other officers specially skilled in the above 
areas. Those selected to visit Australia were Messrs W A Dexheimer and 
A B Reeves, both having had wide experience on tunnels, whilst Messrs 
3 3 Hammond and R Rhoades were the Bureau's Senior Engineers in concrete 
dams and geology respectively. [9J All arrived in Australia during February 
1952. Their visit was greatly appreciated and undoubtedly helped the Authority 
in formulating its immediate program of works, "and getting things under 
way expeditiously". [lOj 
In addition to these engineers, Dr 3 L Savage who assisted in the 
original discussions and negotiations between the SMA and USBR, and Mr 
F C Walker the senior engineer of the earth dam section of the Bureau, 
who were both in Australia at that time, took part in site inspections and 
discussions regarding the Tumut Pond Damsite, from the 16 to 23 February 
1932. 
The preliminary design layouts prepared by the Bureau based on 
information supplied by the Authority were brought to Australia by Dexheimer. 
He also brought with him estimates for alternative layouts in relation 
to Tumut Pond Dam, which were based on similarly situated jobs in the 
USA, and schedules of quantities for the various layouts so that unit rates 
could be inserted by the Authority and estimates prepared for Australian 
conditions. 
At this time the Authority was advised that it was necessary to 
prepare a report setting out the operational studies in relation to T1 Power 
Station. Several typical reports prepared by the Bureau for similar work 
were sent to the Authority to be used as a ' reference' during the preparation 
of the Authority's report, [ l l j The work to be designed by the Bureau 
was to be based on this operational report. 
From the commencement of training and technical assistance by 
the Bureau to December 31, 1952, cost was $315,^50, made up as follows: 
Overhead charge (in accordance with the Agreement) $ 500 
Adaminaby Tunnel - preparation of designs and eng.spec's 80 000 
Tumut-Tl Tunnel - " " " " " 30 000 
Tumut Pond Dam - " " " " " 90 000 
Preliminary work leading up to preparation of final 
designs and specifications 100 000 
2 trainees for 6 months arrived 26.11.51 685 
2 " " 1 2 months " " 1 370 
k " " " " to arrive January 1952 2 735 
k " " 1 1 " to arrive February 1952 2 510 
Assignment of 4 Bureau Engineers to Australia for 60 days 1 650 
Grand Total: $315 ^50 
In all cases the specifications were patterned a f te r Bureau specifi-
cations [12j with no a t tempt to modify them for any Australian conditions. 
This arrangement proved quite satisfactory to the Authority. [13J 
The first of the designs and contract plans for work on the Upper 
Tumut River were received in January 1953. In his letter [l^J conveying 
the Authority's deep appreciation of the help the Bureau was giving both 
in the preparation of designs and in the training and experience Authority 
engineers were receiving, Hudson foreshadowed that the Bureau might 
consider the execution of additional design work, and the secondment of 
two engineers with extensive experience in the construction of large dams, 
tunnels and associated works, and in the supervision and administration 
of large contracts . 
Hudson further wrote to the USBR on 1 June 1953 [15j following 
up discussions between Lang (SMA) and Dexheimer and Reeves during their 
visit to the Snowy Mountains area in March 1953, and his letter of 19 
January 1953, advising that it was proposed to ask the Bureau to carry 
out detailed designs and drawings in connection with those works of the 
Upper Tumut developments for which it had already prepared specification 
designs and contract drawings. These works were the Eucumbene-Tumut 
Tunnel, the Tumut Pond Dam and T1 Pressure Tunnel and Surge Tank. 
In addition, it was hoped that the Bureau would have been able to undertake 
fur ther work in connection with the T2 Project which was immediately 
downstream of the T1 development on the Tumut River, and it was probable 
that there would be other projects, such as the Kosciusko Dam, that the 
Authority would seek Bureau assistance with. This was additional to the 
review of the designs of Adaminaby Dam and the actual designs and speci-
fications for the permanent outlet gates of that dam being constructed 
by the NSW Public Works Department on behalf of the Authority which 
it had earlier requested the Bureau to do. He requested the Bureau to 
also prepare detailed Design Reports, Designer's Operating Instructions 
and Perfornnance Specifications for the gates, valves and other mechanical 
installations for the work which the Bureau has already designed for the 
Authority. [16j 
It had become obvious that the Bureau was playing a signficant role 
in the design stages and this in turn was allowing the Scheme to rapidly 
develop. With the view that such assistance should continue, Hudson advised 
that the immediate program of works, additional to that already authorised, 
that the Authority would want the Bureau to carry out was at least equivalent 
to that which had already been carried out on its behalf. Similarly, the 
SMA was anxious to continue the in-service training scheme. 
Hudson still held the view that the Authority was weak in certain 
areas and pressed the Bureau to second several engineers with extensive 
experience in the construction of large dams, tunnels, power stations and 
associated works to strengthen the Authority's staff engaged on the supervision 
and administration of large contracts. This would embrace a very senior 
engineer who would be capable of co-ordinating the Authority's construction 
and design work, keeping in mind the major contracts which were to be 
awarded towards the end of 1953, as well as several other engineers who 
could assist on major sections of the work or act as project engineers 
for the major contracts. 
Hudson saw the continuance of technical assistance by the Bureau 
as a vital factor in enabling the Authority: 
. to implement the very large program of work, which it is carrying 
out for the Australian Government in the immediate future. This assistance 
will also enable the Authority to consolidate its organisation so as 
to cope with the very much greater volume of work required to bring 
the Snowy Mountains Scheme to completion".(p.2)[17j 
Lineweaver replied that the Bureau could see no reason why they 
would or should not be able to take care of the work and other activities 
outlined by Hudson. [18J 
Hudson followed up the issue of seconded engineers with an alternative 
proposal to that already mentioned. [19J This alternative was for a senior 
engineer to undertake the overall direction and administration of all construction 
work, i.e. both major contracts and work being done by the Authority forces; 
a senior engineer to take charge of design and the scientific services 
group (research); and up to 3 engineers who would work under the senior 
engineer acting as project engineers for the main contracts. It was at 
this t ime that Mr W A Dexheimer, who had visited the Scheme on several 
occasions to provide advice and a liaison service, was appointed Commi-
ssioner of the USBR. The Authority was thus in the fortunate position 
of having in the senior officer of the Bureau someone who had first hand 
experience of the Scheme's design, its location and geography and its resources. 
On 23 October 1933 the USBR confirmed that it would assist the 
Authority in performing designwork for the T2 Project (as discussed during 
Hudson's visit to Washington and Denver) in accordance with recent cor-
respondence to Lineweaver and McClellan. Work on the general layout 
of the project would commence as soon as the basic information and re-
commendations were received. The Bureau also confirmed the assignment 
of senior engineering personnel to serve with the Authority: 
. to assist in its program of construction of large dams, tunnels, power 
stations and associated works and its supervision and administration 
of the associated contracts", (p.l) [20] 
These advisors arrived in Australia during 1953. 
Following discussions between the Authority and the water conservation 
authorities of NSW and Victoria towards the end of 1953 it became apparent 
that the Authority was able to divert water from the Tooma to the Tumut 
River at a much earlier date than was originally planned. This necessitated 
certain changes to the Authority's design and construction programs, which 
were to be discussed in detail in Australia with Mr H Bahmeier, the Bureau's 
Senior Engineering Advisor and his associates, before finalising the forward 
program and defining the work to be carried out by the Bureau. It was not 
anticipated that this would cause any change in the overall magnitude of the 
work, and a further $1^0 000 had been sent to the U.S. State Department 
to cover the immediate needs of the Bureau [21J in accordance with the 
agreed financial arrangements. 
Following detailed investigations and discussions regarding the T2 
project which consisted of a diversion dam, a headrace tunnel with intake 
structure, headrace tunnel surge chamber, twin pressure shafts and power 
station, tailrace tunnel, surge chamber and tailrace tunnel, it was decided 
by the Authority that the work should be split, the Authority's forces designing 
the pressure shafts, the power station, and the spillway gates on the diversion 
dam, and the Bureau providing a general review of the proposed layout 
of the project; the preparation of the designs and contract and construction 
drawings for all civil engineering works associated with T2 Diversion dam, 
intake and headrace tunnel, Headrace Tunnel Surge Chamber, Tailrace Tunnel 
Surge Chamber and Tailrace Tunnel; preparation of designs and drawings 
for all structures associated with the above works, with the exception of 
the spillway gates on the Diversion Dam; and the preparation of draft clauses 
for the technical specifications relating to works designed. To assist with 
the portion of the Bureau's assignment, the Authority sent them the Report 
on Investigations into the T2 Project, Regional and Project geology reports, 
alternative site proposal, status of geological investigations as at 21 March 
1935, analysis of water in the Tumut River, concrete aggregates, hydrological 
data, rating curves, drafting standards, photo-theodolite photographs, and 
survey plans and negatives. The Bureau advised its preparedness to assist 
with the work with a preliminary cost estimate of $375 000 [23J. 
Following a review of its program for the years 1955-57 the Authority 
came to the conclusion [23j that it would be most advantageous to bring 
the diversion of the Tooma River to the Tumut River forward so that 
completion of the diversion virtually coincided with the completion of 
the T1 Power Station towards the end of 1959. This project consisted 
essentially of a dam on the Tooma River and a diversion tunnel to the 
Tumut River at Tumut Pond. Originally, it was anticipated that this might 
connect into the Eucumbene-Tumut Tunnel near Tumut Pond but later 
studies showed that it was desirable to have a separate entrance to Tumut 
Pond with a cross connection to the Eucumbene-Tumut Tunnel with appropriate 
regulating valves and control gates. It was proposed that the work could 
be divided, by the Bureau undertaking the lower part of the tunnel, and 
also the design and arrangement of the outlet to Tumut Pond and the 
interconnections with the Eucumbene-Tunnut Tunnel. This would involve 
at least two control structures as well as the tunnel design. Bureau officers 
were familiar with the general layout of Tumut Pond and the lower end of 
the Eucumbene-Tumut Tunnel, the design of which was carried out by the 
Bureau. 
The Bureau advised the Authority that in light of its heavy progrann, 
there would be a limitation on the work they could perform. They were 
able to assist with the complete design and detailing of the gates or valves, 
and operating equipment, with transmittal of completed tracings, together 
with calculations, manufacturer's data on standard accessories, and drafts 
of specifications. These would be completed in the same manner and to 
the same extent as for earlier projects however, if applicable existing Bureau 
gate and hoist designs would be modified to suit in the same manner as 
modifications to existing designs for spillway radial gates and hoists did for 
outlet guard and regulating gates and hoists at T2 Diversion Dam were 
contemplated. They also prepared general informational data including 
schematic diagrams of electrical wiring and hydraulic piping.[2^J Local 
control equipment for activating this was also designed and detailed, and 
information relative to the telemetering and remote control equipment 
was also developed. 
The USBR proceeded to assist with 12 Project however this was not 
without some problems. After completion of the reinforcement drawings and 
bar lists for the tunnels and tunnel structures on the Eucumbene-Tumut 
and T1 Projects, the Bureau became concerned with the time and personnel 
estimated to be required on similar work on the 12 Project tunnels and 
tunnel structures. Its inability to engage qualified engineering personnel 
together with their increased domestic work program forced the Bureau to 
examine all available alternatives regarding staff and workload. They 
requested the Authority to assign six of their engineering trainees to Denver 
for 8 to 10 weeks beginning approximately March 1957, to assist with 
the preparation of reinforcement drawings for T2 Project. [25J This was 
regarded as an excellent opportunity for them to gain experience in that 
type of work and to become familiar with detail designs. In regard to 
the Tooma-Tumut diversion, designs were completed by October 1956 and 
all reinforcement drawings and bar lists for concrete work were completed 
by April 1957. Designs on the T2 Project were actioned on the basis that 
specification drawings were completed in November 1956 and final design 
drawings by March 1957. 
As design assistance on the Tumut 1 project was completed the 
Bureau took on additional work from the Tumut 2 and other Snowy projects 
though this was clearly more than had been envisaged in the initial approval 
for assistance by the USBR. This additional work included all drawings 
and technical paragraphs to enable contracts to be called, design drawings 
for the four adits (specifying location, size, grade and other details) and 
terminus of the tunnel for the Adaminaby-Snowy Tunnel, at a cost of 
$165 000, and complete stress analysis and preparation of all specification 
drawings and technical paragraphs for the Island Bend Dam, at a cost of 
$80 500. This work was completed by the end of June 1958 [26j. 
Other technical assistance provided by the USBR was based on specific 
requests from the Authority which flowed from both sequential development 
in planning of the Scheme, and from changes made to the design criteria 
as a result of further investigations by Authority and USBR staff . The 
former category included design work for the Murrumbidgee-Eucumbene 
Diversion, and the Snowy-Geehi Project [27J, a nine mile nominally unlined 
tunnel with associated connections, shafts, gates, outlet structures and 
adits, whilst the latter included modifications to construction drawings 
for the Tumut 2 Diversion Dam and associated head and tailrace surge 
tank structures, and outlet gates. 
The design layouts both preliminary and final, schedules of quantities 
for the various layouts, the use by the Authority of the 'typical reports' 
as used by the Bureau, the use of the USBR model for specifications, completion 
of detailed designs and drawings (as opposed to specification designs and 
contract drawings), design reports, operating instructions, performance 
specifications, construction drawings, completed tracings, calculations 
and manufacturers data on standard accessories, modifications of existing 
designs to suit, schematic diagrams for electrical wiring and hydraulic 
piping, design and detail of control equipment, and development of relevant 
information on telemetering and remote control equipment, were all examples 
of a technical ability possessed by the Bureau in the USA, a source clearly 
external to the area in which the technology was to be applied. This direct 
assistance by the USBR enabled the transfer of the technology to the Scheme 
and to Australia. Without this process which was mainly confined to formal, 
non interactive methods but also involved some personal contact, the con-
struction of the Upper Tumut works would not have been able to continue 
at the pace, both in terms of construction and sequence, that it did. It 
is also a fact that construction and operation of the other parts of the 
Scheme would not have been completed as they were without the application 
by Scheme officers of principles, methods and techniques learned from 
Bureau practices and procedures, and directly from USBR personnel. The 
Authority incorporated in its practices, the superior elements of Bureau 
practice. 
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SMA file - Agreement Between the Commonwealth of 
Australia and the United States of America for Technical 
Training and Technical Assistance - Financial Arrangements. 
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SMA file - Agreement Between the Commonwealth of 
Australia and the United States of America for Technical 
Training and Technical Assistance - Policy. (Part 2) 
THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 
ADVISORY TEAM IN AUSTRALIA 
When the Snowy Mountains Authority was established in 19^9, [ IJ 
planning had been developed only to the stage of establishing the general 
policy of water utilisation and of ensuring that the general proposal was 
practically and economically sound. 
The Authority thus had the task of preparing a strategy to achieve 
the proper and economical construction of the Scheme [2J which included 
detailed land, geological and hydrographical surveys to ascertain the basic 
data as to topography, foundation conditions and water resources, and 
the planning of the most economical full utilisation of the water resources 
of the area. The order and rate of construction had also to be planned 
to ensure the early development of power to relieve existing shortages, 
the most economical operation of the hydro stations in conjunction with 
existing thermal stations, that power would be produced in stages suitable 
for absorption by the existing power systems of New South Wales and Victoria, 
and the early inland diversion of Snowy waters to increase irrigation supplies. 
Inherent in this strategy was planning for and of the economical 
sizes and types of structures such as sizes of tunnels, heights and types 
of dams, capacities of racelines, transmission voltages; the location and 
nature of access roads and of location and layout of townships, workshops 
and other buildings for construction purposes; and the most economic 
construction methods and procedures for construction plant, equipment 
and the provision of power for construction purposes. 
The Scheme is a complex one both in regard to the types of engin-
eering structures involved and in the nature of the river diversions [3J. 
Particular features of the Scheme include the large amount of tunnelling 
required, the underground location of many of the power stations and the 
use of very high voltage transmission lines to convey the energy produced 
to the load centres in NSW and Victoria. It should be noted here that this 
330 000 volt transmission which formed an important link between the 
power distribution centres of the states of Victoria and New South Wales 
was the first of its kind in the southern hemisphere. 
As early as April 19^9 it was foreshadowed that the Snowy River 
Construction Authority as it was then known, would invite United States 
experts whose knowledge covered the problem areas likely to arise on the 
Scheme, to come to Australia, look over the project and tender advice.[^J 
These problem areas were thought to cover the construction of dams, long 
tunnels of major dimension through rock, and the installation of machinery 
required for the development of hydro-electric power. Indeed formal arrange-
ments had engineers of the USBR visiting the Scheme to assist with initial 
design considerations. These engineers included Assistant Chief Construction 
Engineer, later Commissioner, of the USBR, Mr W Dexheimer, in November 
1950, who returned in 1952 with Mr A E Reeves in connection with the 
initiation of the first phase of the co-operative program between the USBR 
and the SMA. Both of these engineers had been in close contact with 
the work as it had developed since 1930 [5j. 
The first USBR Advisers arrived in Cooma early in 195^f. The team 
included Messrs H F Bahmeier as Senior Engineering Adviser, H R Orr as 
Engineering Design Adviser, E C Higginson as Engineering Adviser, and 
R B Ward and 3 R Walton as Construction Engineering Advisers, all of 
whom had a close knowledge of the technologies to be introduced. 
Following Associate Commissioner and Chief Engineer McClellan's 
visit to Australia in June 195^, Commissioner Hudson [6j advised of the 
awarding of the three major contracts for the UT Development works 
and as a direct result of the visit, the re-organisation of some of the 
Authority's work areas including the placement of the overall control and 
co-ordination of the Major Contracts Division, Design Division and Scientific 
Services Division under Mr I B Hughes as Chief Civil Engineer. The Bureau's 
Senior Engineering Adviser, Mr H F Bahmeier, was assigned the role of 
advising and assisting the Chief Civil Engineer in regard to the overall 
control of these three Divisions with particular attention to the needs 
and services not only of these Divisions, but also for the Upper Tumut 
Development contracts. 
Mr Orr, Engineering Design Adviser, was attached to the Design 
Division, and Mr Higginson as Engineer Adviser to the Scientific Services 
Division. Messrs Ward and Walton, Construction Engineering Advisers, 
were attached to the Major Contracts Division and were stationed at 
Cabramurra to advise and assist the Senior Resident Engineer who was 
in charge of the field supervision of the contracts. 
It was originally proposed that there should have been a third construction 
Engineering Adviser but it was finally decided that Messrs Ward and Walton 
could satisfactorily carry out the necessary field supervision work. At 
that t ime it was anticipated that the contractors would establish their 
main offices in the field, probably in the vicinity of Cabramurra. Kaiser-
Walsh-Perini-Raymond who were awarded the contracts for the Eucumbene-
Tumut tunnel and the Tumut Pond Dam, established their main office at 
Cooma with field offices at Eucumbene Portal, Junction Shaft and Cabramurra, 
however, whilst the French group had their main office in the field near 
Cabrannurra. This undoubtedly complicated effect ive communciations, 
field supervision and contract administration. In light of this and the lack 
of experience of the Authority's engineers in handling contracts of the 
magnitude of those for the T.l works, it became more obvious to Hudson, 
as the detailed organisation for the administration of the contracts developed, 
that there was a pressing need for a contract administration engineer to 
assist the Major Contracts Division at Cooma and to expedite the engineering 
work required to properly service the contracts.[7j The resignation of 
one of the Authority's senior engineers experienced in tunnel construction 
and who had been allocated to the Eucumbene-Tumut Tunnel, necessitated 
Messrs Ward and Walton spending all their time in the field advising and 
training the Authority's engineers in field work and assisting the senior 
resident engineer at Cabramurra. As a result they could not, as had been 
hoped, spend some of their time in Cooma. In addition the majority of 
the Authority's engineers associated with the contracts were placed in 
field positions, leaving only relatively junior and inexperienced engineers 
available for contract administration duties at Head Office in Cooma. 
Hudson pressed the Bureau to make available an engineer with experience 
in contract administration and construction management. Such an appointment 
he argued ". . . would provide much needed training for the Authority's 
personnel in the administration and management of the T.l contracts and 
would assist in building an organisation that would later operate without 
Bureau assistance. . ." (p.2)[8j Hudson's experience with USBR staff whilst 
on the Warragamba Dam project may well have led to his conviction that 
personal interaction greatly assisted the more formal means of communication 
and training.[9j This engineer was to take the role of a Construction 
8if 
Management Consultant whose duties were to aid, advise and guide Australian 
personnel who had the following responsibilities in contract administration: 
preparation of extra work orders, change orders, findings of fact and corres-
pondence connected therewith; recommend to the Divisional Head approval 
or disapproval of contractors ' claims; review notices of delay and requests 
for extension of t ime under construction contracts; make initial determination 
as to whether delay was excusable on the basis of facts found; review 
contract payment schedules for major items of construction plant and 
equipment; analysis of contractor 's anticipated production schedules and 
ra te of encumbrance of funds under the contract; recommend organisational 
changes to achieve better co-ordination with the activities of the Civil 
Design and Scientific Services Divisions; and supervise estimating and 
cost analysis sections and participate in conferences with representatives 
of the contractor relative to all contract matters. In addition they were 
to prepare or supervise the preparation of correspondence in reply to enquiries 
from contractors and field offices for interpretation or clarification of 
contracts and specifications. The making of field trips in connection with 
these duties for the purpose of advising and guiding field officials in the 
preparation of data and contract modification documents, claims, procedures, 
relationships with contractors regarding claims, and installation and maintenance 
of proper claims procedure and related work was also involved. There 
were no direct administrative or supervisory responsibilities, rather they 
were of an advisory and training nature only. 
On 1 October 195^f, McClellan advised [lOj that Mr J D Seery, Assistant 
Construction Engineer at Folsom California, had been selected to fill the 
position of Construction Management Engineer. Seery had been associated 
with Bahmeier on several Bureau construction jobs in the past both within 
the USA and abroad. 
As the 2-year period for which USBR officers had been loaned to 
the Authority expired early in 1956, it was decided that the Authority 
should seek an extension by 12 months for three or four of the USBR officers 
associated with contract administration and the remaining two or three 
experienced design engineers to assist in strengthening the Design Division[llJ 
of the Authority. This was subsequently approved by the USBR although 
there had been changes in the USBR staff in America who had knowledge 
of the Scheme. The duties and relationships of the engineering advisers 
at tached to the Authority changed with the effluction of time, but only 
with the agreement of the USBR. In November 1955 Assistant Comm-
issioner and Chief Engineer of the USBR McClellan agreed that the engineering 
advisers should have somewhat altered roles to reflect the changing require-
ments of the Authority.[12j 
Whilst it is doubtful that the Engineering Advisors thought of them-
selves or were thought of by others as formal agents of transfer, there 
can be litt le doubt that their roles were to encourage and facili tate the 
introduction of processes, practices and techniques used by the USBR that 
were appropriate to the Australian situation. 
Mr H F Bahmeier Senior Engineering Adviser, and Head of the team, 
who had been with the Authority since 195^ and whose assignment continued 
to 17 February 1958, was responsible for supervising and implementing 
Bureau policies and procedures in relation to other engineering advisers. 
He also advised the Public Works Department of NSW on the design and 
construction of Adaminaby Dam and acted as Chairman of the Liaison 
Conferences between the Public Works Department and the Authority. 
With the assistance of Mr J D Seery he maintained liaison with the Bureau 
of Reclamation on the design work being carried out by the Bureau for 
the Authority. In regard to construction, his attention was directed primarily 
to Adaminaby Dam, Tooma Dam, and to all construction works in progress. 
Mr 3 D Seery, Construction Management Adviser, whose assignment 
terminated on 6 March 1937 acted as assistant to Bahmeier in relation 
to liaison functions between the Bureau and the Authority on design work 
being carried out by the Bureau and advised and assisted in regard to contract 
administration, specifications, and office engineering and general contract 
administration. Stationed at Cooma, he assisted Bahmeier with regard 
to advice on both the Adaminaby and Tooma Dams. 
Messrs P von der Lippe and F E Cornwell, Engineering Advisers 
on Design (whose assignments terminated on 5 March and 10 May 1938 
respectively) were responsible for aiding and advising the Authority in 
the ef fec t ive planning, co-ordination, and execution of design work. Although 
certain designations were originally mentioned in the assignments for these 
officers (power stations for Von der Lippe, and dams and tunnels for Cornwell), 
it was considered by the Authority that it was to their advantage for these 
advisers to be attached generally to the Engineer-in-Charge, Civil Engineering 
Design, rather than be segregated into the Power Stations and Dams and 
Tunnels Branches. This enabled full advantage to be taken of their individual 
skills and experience. Cornwell's experience in special and scientific studies 
with the Bureau enabled him to provide valuable advice and assistance 
in co-ordinating the work of the Scientific Services Division with the 
design and construction areas of the Authority to achieve maximum utilisation 
of the facilities available in the scientific services area. Similarly, Von 
der Lippe's broad experience in the design and construction of power stations 
and other works enabled him not only to give valuable assistance to the 
Power Station Branch, but also to advise in relation to the co-ordination 
of this work with other design and construction operations. 
The final member of the team, Mr F Goerhing, the Engineering Adviser 
Construction, was stationed at Cabramurra and acted as general construction 
adviser to the Engineer-in-Charge of Major Contracts, in connection with 
the administration of the contracts for the Upper Tumut development. 
The functions of the Advisory Team, in general terms, comprised 
advice, assistance and guidance to Authority staff in the execution of the 
Authority's program of design and construction work. No direct supervision 
of design and construction activities was undertaken, however it is clear 
that their role encompassed supervision in a de facto sense by encouragement 
and suggestions of correction and variation to practice. 
Specifically, the assistance and guidance provided by the Advisory 
Team can be said to fall into the categories of organisation structure, 
contracts and contract administration, construction supervision, pre and 
post construction planning, training and co-ordination. 
Organisation Structure 
In the early days of its operation the Authority's organisation structure, 
whilst not typical of Statutory Authorities[13j, reflected the areas of its 
main concerns, investigation, assembly and completion of design data. 
preparation of specifications for each development (at this early stage it 
was the Tumut 1 developnnent) and the completion by day labour forces 
of access roads, accommodation, and the electrical and communications 
sytems which were necessary to enable the initiation of large scale operations 
on construction of permanent works. 
With the commencement of work under large contracts, due signi-
ficantly to Advisory Team recommendations, the first of several important 
re-organisational steps was made in May 195^. A Major Contracts Division 
was established and a Chief Civil Engineer appointed to exercise general 
control and co-ordination over activities of the Civil Design, Scientific 
Services and Major Contracts Divisions. This also led to consolidation of 
other Divisions. Suggestions and advice concerning the functional organisa-
tion of the new Major Contracts Division were specifically requested from, 
and were provided by, the Advisory Team. This was especially so with 
regard to the proposed field organisation for the supervision of Tumut 
1 Project contracts[l^J. 
The Authority originally contemplated that the field organisation 
for the supervision of these contracts would contain three independent 
groups, one for each contract . The Advisors however recommended that 
all three contracts be administered by one Senior Resident Engineer located 
at Cabramurra (the Regional township and headquarters for the Upper 
Tumut construction), from where all off ice engineering and clerical functions 
required for the three contracts would be performed. They further recommended 
that there should be, responsible to the Senior Resident Engineer, Resident 
Engineers and inspection crews in charge of work under the individual 
contracts at specified geographic locations. These recommendations were 
accepted by the Authority and in addition to the Cabramurra headquarters, 
resident engineering offices were established at Junction Shaft to supervise 
contract 20,002, and two at Cabramurra to supervise contracts 20,003 
and 20,00^. Other assistance was provided to the Authority by the Advisors 
with respect to general staffing requirements. Team member P Von der 
Lippe for example advised that concrete outline and reinforcement drawings 
for the Tumut 1 Project would total some 153 drawings which translated 
to ^59 man-weeks (153 x 3 man-weeks per drawing) and if they were to 
be completed within 26 weeks then 18 people were required. Given that 
the workforce was 10, 8 more were needed if the construction schedule 
was to be maintained.[16j 
In addition to field offices, the Advisory Team were instrumental 
in the establishment of field laboratories to deal with contracts. The 
establishment of these field control laboratories followed the Advisory 
Team's preparation of plans, policies and techniques based on their USBR 
experience. Indeed the plans prepared for the construction of a laboratory 
at Cabramurra were substantially altered because of team recommendations, 
from the construction of a new building to remodelling of an existing facility 
which resulted in a considerable cost saving.[16j 
Recommendations were also made with regard to the overall arrangements 
and requirements for engineering laboratories with the result that the 
Hydraulic, Chemistry, Geology and Photographic Laboratories and workshops 
were finalised and constructed consistent with USBR practices and avoiding 
unjustifiable laboratory luxuries.[17j 
In addition to broad recommendations for physical improvements 
many discussions with laboratory personnel of all grades took place at 
which the techniques of laboratory testing and research and development 
as used by the USBR were described and referred to. Considerable technical 
information and data was obtained from the USBR by the team for use 
by Authority personnel. Much emphasis was placed on the value of working, 
as a first priority, on those practical problems which directly assisted 
in the investigation, design, preparation of specifications, and construction 
of each feature of the project. In the same way the Advisory Team encouraged 
Authority staff to perform library research on relevant subjects to obtain 
the best advice and record what had been done elsewhere before launching 
off on an expensive and hurried plan to solve in a short time and in a 
novel way, a problem that had been successfully solved elsewhere. 
Further organisational changes, directed towards improvement of 
service, changing needs, and better inter-divisional co-ordination, were 
made by the Authority over a period of time, based on recommendations 
and influence [18J of the Advisory Team members. 
The Advisors were also commissioned [19J by the Authority to complete 
a comparative study of costs and staffing between the USBR and the Authority. 
Using budget documents, progress reports and other supplementary data 
a comparison was made and utilised by the Authority in considerations 
regarding structures, levels and organisational mechanics.[20j 
Not all the Advisory team's recommendations were adopted however. 
No amount of influence, argument or examples based on USBR experience 
succeeded in persuading the Authority to devolve overall technical control, 
records and associated procedures to regional operations.[22j These were 
maintained in Cooma head off ice. 
Contracts and Contract Administration 
The history of civil engineering contracting in Australia is not a 
long one. At least until the late 1930s, the econonny was not in a position 
to make available large amounts of capital. What did become available 
came from State or Federal Governments whose policies committed them 
to performing development work using day labour rather than contracts.[22j 
Post war years in Australia however saw a major change in the development 
and economic strength of the country. Population and investment grew as 
did Government spending [23j on developmental works. Most construction 
work in Australia though was still done by day labour forces, and what 
contract work had been accomplished had generally been on a cost plus 
fixed fee basis. Indeed the contracts for the construction of the initial 
aspects of the Scheme, Guthega Dam and Munyang (Guthega) Power Station, 
were of the cost plus fixed fee type covering both design and construction. 
Advice from the USBR in America coupled with argument and experience 
presented by the Advisory Team on site in Australia were major factors in 
convincing the Authority that large scale construction works such as the 
Scheme should be undertaken utilising a schedule of unit prices contract as 
opposed to the cost plus fixed fee type. The Tumut 1 Project contracts 
were the first large scale construction works undertaken by the Authority 
under a schedule of unit prices.[2^J 
Cost plus fixed fee contracts provide for a fixed sum to be paid 
to a contractor in addition to the actual cost of the work. This often 
provides an inducement to speed and economise, for every delay keeps 
the contractor from another job, ties up plant, and increases overhead 
costs which must be met from the fee. This type of contract has the 
advantage on difficult and hazardous jobs where the risks are great, that 
tenderers need not bid high to cover themselves against possible loss. 
It also lends itself to the situation whereby the cost of the job can exceed 
its agreed estimated cost.[23j Schedule of unit prices or schedule of rates 
contracts on the other hand are those in which the contractor carries out 
various clearly defined classes of work at stipulated unit rates. The work 
to be done is scheduled as accurately as the quantities can be estimated, 
but the actual quantities are measured in the completed work and paid 
for at the prices stated in the tender. These are therefore the fairest 
type of tender for both parties [26j in terms of costs, payments, speed 
of job and quality of work. 
In light of the fact that construction of major works by unit price 
contracts was a new field in Australia, and that the Authority was pioneering 
this field, the assistance of the Advisors and the application of the Advisory 
Team's experience based on similar Bureau of Reclamation work proved 
to be of invaluable assistance in the successful use of such contracts. 
As mentioned the Authority pioneered the use of unit-price contracts 
in Australia and as a result had to change the emphases placed on many 
aspects of its procedures and practices, not the lease of which was a greatly 
increased emphasis on good specifications containing complete design detail. 
The Advisory Team placed great emphasis on this aspect and stressed the 
possibilities of conflicts, delays, inferior workmanship and increased costs 
resulting from déficiences and/or the omission of complete design details 
from the specifications. These results had been demonstrated under contract 
No. 20,00^, where early construction of access roads was required but 
where alignment and other design details were not included in the speci-
fications. Because of this lack of design details, the work cost more than 
originally contemplated, took longer to accomplish, and required excessive 
administrative attention. Lack of firm structure layouts and dimensions 
for T.l Power Station was another case.[27j 
The Authority's officers as a result became more aware of the need 
for completing designs before calling for tenders. Indeed in the preparation 
of drawings and specifications for the Tumut 2 Project and the Tooma-Tumut 
Diversion[28j, every effor t was made to develop firm project arrangements 
and structure layouts which were unlikely to require extensive changes 
af ter commencement of construction. 
The Authority at this time also had a weakness in detail design. 
The Advisory Team stressed [29j the necessity for thorough investigations 
of physical facts pertinent to construction of the various features of each 
project, timely programming of all features and adequate designs and 
specifications, in order to avoid the necessity for changes during the 
administration of the contract . One method developed for avoiding such 
modifications and changes based on the Team's emphasis was the then 
Chief Civil Engineer's requirement that design sections submit with their 
construction drawings, estimates of costs for all alterations and/or changes 
involved therein. This procedure allowed for careful review of all proposals 
which were at variance with the contract and specifications. 
The Advisory Team was also instrumental in getting schedules set 
up for production of construction drawings and procurement of material and 
equipment to be furnished by the Authority and installed by the contractors. 
The Officer of the Civil Design Group who had responsibility for these 
schedules collaborated with both the Electrical and Mechanical Division 
and the Major Contracts Group, to ensure effect ive co-ordination of e f for t . 
The Authority had instituted an arrangement early in its development 
whereby monthly meetings were held with the contractors and senior s taff . 
These meetings which were attended by members of the Advisory Team, 
assisted greatly in the development of a co-operative atmosphere and in 
the prompt and businesslike exchange of information and service by the 
parties involved. Here the negotiations concerning extras and changes 
were initiated and discussed. When agreements were reached, the preparation 
and issuance of contract modifications proceeded rapidly.[30j These documents 
insofar as possible were patterned af ter the USBR's. The rough drafts 
were prepared in the field offices and forwarded to the Cooma Head Office 
for review, approval and final printing. Claims were handled in the same 
manner. Advisory Teams' assistance being given in all phases of the negotiations 
and preparation of documents. 
Field assistance was provided on a full time basis, attention being 
given to achievement of schedules, inspections, reports and records, safety, 
construction procedures and interpretation of specifications. 
Suggestions and recommendations regarding organisation and personnel 
for field administration of contracts were also issued from time to time 
in order that a uniformity of inspection, workmanship and quality of construction 
could be achieved. 
The range of areas covered by USBR advisors in the general field 
of contracts and contract administration was therefore very broad and 
included policy matters, the development of standard operating procedures, 
and the insistence on close attention being paid to general and technical 
details for application to the construction and supply contracts. This latter 
aspect included the need for closer examination of tenders to determine 
whether the contractor possessed the necessary finance, experience and 
construction plant to complete the job in the specified time.[31J 
Liaison and communication patterns and systems within the Authority's 
organisation relative to contracts also received attention by the team, 
to ensure the development of co-operation and team work within the various 
sections. Economical usage of materials was encouraged and in some cases 
considerable savings were realised [32j by the use of locally available material 
in lieu of imports from overseas. 
Construction Supervision 
Advisory Team assistance was also provided to Authority personnel 
involved in inspection of construction work and the field administration 
of the contracts. Emphasis for field personnel was placed on the importance 
of co-operating with contractors to the extent of assisting and permitting 
them to carry out their work as efficiently and expeditiously as possible. 
Inspectors were advised that although the work was to be performed in 
full accord with the plans and specifications, their decisions should as 
far as possible be fair and reasonable. Probable and likely causes of contractual 
difficulties were pointed out and advice given regarding methods of operation 
by contractors, pitfalls to be avoided and means of counteracting 'tricks' 
that contractors often tried. Some of the main points on which advice 
was given included[33j: 
"(a) To be thoroughly acquainted with contract drawings and specifications. 
(b) Avoid causing delays by failure to issue instructions, deliver detailed 
construction drawings and Government furnished materials in enough 
time. 
(c) Avoid unnecessary delays which cause the contractor extra work or 
added costs. 
(d) In all decisions and instructions to contractors, bear in mind that it 
is results of work that are important, not methods of attaining the 
results. 
(e) Be alert to unsafe practices or working conditions. 
(f) Keep good records of instructions given, causes of delays, extra work 
performed, e tc , for later use, if needed, in preparation of findings 
of fact , answering contractors' claims, litigation, e tc , and 
(g) In reviewing drawings submitted by the contractor for approval, the 
prime requisite being to ascertain conformity with the specification." 
(p.2) 
In addition to providing the advice on construction supervision in 
written form, team members attached to the various areas and projects 
regularly assisted in, and commented on, the physical examination and 
supervision of the projects under construction. 
Construction Planning 
The Advisors also gave Authority personnel assistance with the review 
of contractors drawings and plans for camps, construction plant, tunnel 
supports, and tunnel lining forms. Plans of the contractors' cement handling 
plant at Cooma, the concrete aggregate processing plant at Happy Jacks, 
and the plant for installing reinforcing steel and concrete tunnel linings 
were specially considered in studies and discussions. 
Contractors' construction programs were carefully reviewed by the 
Advisory Team with particular attention being given to control or delivery 
of Authority-furnished materials and construction drawings, conformity 
with contract provisions, consistency, proper sequence of operation for 
completion of the various items within the contract times, and ef fec t 
on administrative and program responsibilities.[3^J 
Training 
Closely related to the issue of construction planning and supervision 
was that of training. The training of Australian Engineers in America 
by the USBR is dealt with in detail at a later section, however it must 
be said that when they returned to Australia they, with continued field 
assistance from the Advisory Team, did much to overcome problems in 
the areas of inspection of works constructed under contract. 
In addition to the overseas training, the Advisory Team encouraged 
the Authority to undertake the in-house training of other personnel mainly 
tradesmen as inspectors; a decision made easier by the shortage of suitably 
trained and qualified personnel at that time.[35j 
As had been the experience in the USA, these individuals proved 
to be capable inspectors notwithstanding their lack of formal technical 
training. The in-house courses conducted by the Authority to train inspectors 
lasted approximately 3 nnonths consisting of lectures, tutorials, field exercises 
and where applicable laboratory exercises. Courses conducted included 
Survey A, and B, Field Hydrography, Welding and Radiography (for Inspectors), 
Mechanical (for Inspectors), Excavation and Tunnelling (Inspectors), and 
Concrete (for inspectors). In addition conversion courses, in Excavation 
and Tunnelling, and in Concrete were given to inspectors already qualified 
in another category.[36j The Snowy Mountains Authority trained with 
nnarked success sonne 200 men in several fields of civil engineering in less 
than three years, thereby reducing its demand for engineers[37j, due largely 
to the recommendations and experience of the Advisory team. 
Design and Co-ordination Assistance 
Assistance with design and co-ordination of design both with work 
performed in Australia and from the Denver Office of the USBR comprised 
a major part of the Advisory Team's duties. 
Assistance was given to the Chief Civil Designing Engineer and his 
staff in organising and managing the Civil Design Division, planning, pro-
gramming, and executing design work performed for the Authority in Denver. 
This civil design work included review of the contractor 's drawings for 
the Guthega Project (designed by contractor); review of Bureau construction 
drawings for Eucumbene-Tumut Project, Tumut Pond Dam and T.l Pressure 
Tunnel; preparation of construction drawings for T.l Power Station; pre-
liminary design of T.2 Project features; review of Bureau proposals for 
final layout and design of T.2 Diversion Dam and T.2 Project waterways; 
study of final layout of T.2 Power Station and adjacent s t ructures; preparation 
of specification drawings and text for Tooma-Tumut Diversion; and review 
of the Bureau's proposal for the arrangement of the downstreann end of 
the Tooma-Tunnut Tunnel.[38j 
Specification drawings for T.l Power Station (Contract 20,004) were 
also prepared. However, they were from unsufficient data base necessary 
to determine firm s t ructure layouts and diminsions, particularly data on 
hydraulic and electr ical equipment to be installed. This and other unforeseen 
conditions encountered required a number of rather extensive modifications 
to arrangement and design of the various features.[39j The Advisory Team 
part ic ipated in studies, field inspections and discussions on these mat ters , 
as well as design and layout studies for the other projects mentioned above. 
In addition an important function of the Advisory Team was the co-
ordination of design work performed in Australia with that performed for 
the Authority in Denver. It should be noted that the of f ice of Authority 
Liaison Engineer in Denver was abolished in September 195̂ ^ [40j, and from 
tha t date the Bureau Design Engineering Advisor in Cooma was made responsible 
for maintaining liaison with the Denver Off ice regarding design work. 
From that t ime, excepting on mat te rs of policy, all correspondence between 
the Authority and the Bureau concerning exchange of technical information, 
details of design work requested of the Bureau, studies and recommendations 
f rom the Denver of f ice on s t ructure layout and design, t ransmit ta l of drawings 
and d ra f t specifications, revision of drawings, e tc , were conducted through 
the Senior Engineering Advisor. 
The engineering advisors progressively ceased duty with the Authority 
and returned to the USA during 1958. By the time they left design drawings 
and specifications had been completed and contracts let for the major 
part of the Upper Tumut project. 
The role that these agents played in the successful transfer of tech-
nology should not be underestimated. Their technical experience and 
expertise was not challenged by Authority personnel and they were able 
to assist in the smooth implementation of practices and policies based 
largely on Bureau models, but modified where appropriate for Authority 
purposes. The close contact that was maintained by virtue of the Bureau's 
engineers acting as liaison engineers between the USBR in Denver and 
the Authority was a very important instrument in the mutual acceptance 
of modifications to design and specifications which inevitably happen during 
the life of a project. 
Under the tutelage of the USBR advisors, Authority personnel rapidly 
developed experience in contract administration, including the new unit-price 
contracts, construction supervision and construction planning, both at the 
detail and conceptual levels. This ancillary training, education and experience 
building all contributed to the successful transfer. 
That the advisors came from a Government undertaking also assisted 
in their ability to contribute immediately to the needs of the Scheme. 
From their experiences they were aware of how Government structures 
and bureaucracies functioned, of the financial and other resource constraints, 
and of the communication and information channels through which results 
were obtained. 
There can be no doubt that the USBR Advisory Team contributed 
significantly to the successful completion of the Upper Tumut works. 
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AUSTRALIAN ENGINEERS IN TRAINING IN AMERICA 
Just as the Scheme benefitted in terms of savings in costs and time 
by having the Bureau advisors "in situ" in Australia, so too did it benefit 
from having its own engineers in training with the USBR in Denver. 
The shortage of skilled personnel in the areas required for the project, 
contract administration, hydrology and gauging, site investigation, road 
construction, dam design and construction, canals flumes and tunnels, 
powerhouse sub and superstructures, power station plant and equipment, 
switching stations, and transmission lines and distribution [IJ have been 
mentioned previously. Recognition of this shortage of skilled manpower 
available in Australia coupled with the decision to recruit overseas and 
the time lapse inherent in such recruitment led the Authority to include 
in its negotiations with the USBR, training for selected Australian engineering 
s ta f f . It was claimed that at this time the Bureau included amongst its 
Denver staff some of the world's leading authorities in engineering and 
related scientific fields, [2j, the majority of which matched the experience 
requirements of the Authority for construction of the Scheme. 
It is clear that the USBR possessed the technical knowledge and 
capability required by the Authority for the successful development of 
the Scheme. This satisfied one half of a requirement [3J for the successful 
transfer of technology; that the source possess technical knowledge and/or 
capability useful to the receiver. The other half of the equation, that the 
receiver should have complementary knowledge and capability, should understand 
the circumstances and potential contributions of the source, be able to 
demonstrate interest, and support this with its own incentives, was not 
capable of being immediately satisfied by the Authority because of its 
lack of sufficient resources with the complementary knowledge and capability. 
There can be li t t le doubt that the organisation had begun to develop its 
own incentives in terms of infrastructure and operating systems and that 
it understood the contribution the USBR could make in both the technical 
and training areas. In this lat ter regard the Authority decided to send 
some 100 of its engineers [^J to study and train in the various aspects of 
the USSR's operations and techniques in the period 1951 to 1939. 
The recognition of the training role that the Bureau could play occurred 
in the very early days of Scheme for even before the signing of the Agree-
ment[5j which provided for the co-operative program of technical training 
and assistance, the process of selecting trainees and the logistics of transport, 
training, and training administration had begun. This is reinforced by the 
fac t that the first group of trainees arrived in Denver on 22 November 
1951, a mere ten days a f te r the signing of the Agreement. This was at 
a t ime when security and customs clearances and entry visas for the USA 
often took three months to process and approve.[6j 
The practice of sending selected suitable personnel to study under 
the supervision and guidance of more advanced organisations was not new 
when it was first considered within the Authority. The USBR had been 
training both American and foreign students across a large range of disciplines 
for some t ime and at the time of the Authority's request was considering 
requests from three other foreign countries.[7j This system with its emphasis 
on training acknowledged the fact that in addition to the considerable 
preparation and technical e f for t required to ensure that a technology was 
successfully adapted to local conditions, that education, training and 
development of individuals utilising the technology had to be carried out. 
Vickery[8j, in support of this notion, holds the view that ancillary training, 
education and experience building are the key to successful technology 
transfer in that they must acconnpany and facil i tate the smooth introduction 
of international technology. 
In addition to assisting in the understanding and comprehension of 
a new technique or system, the benefits accruing to the organisation from 
training and development include reduced learning time to reach acceptable 
performance levels, improved performance on the present job, att i tude 
formation, resolution of specific operational problems and manpower needs[9j, 
whilst the benefits to the individual include job enrichment, security, status, 
and enhancement of market value. Each of these factors were important 
in their own way to the successful transfer of USBR technology to the 
Scheme. 
In any learning situation, including training, education, development 
and experience building, there is a cumulative process in which individual 
adjustment involves changes that reflect and are based on earlier experiences 
and changes. The individuals reaction in any learning situation is conditioned 
and modified by what has been learned in earlier lessons and experiences[10j. 
In order to ensure that appropriate experiences could be built on, the educa-
tional and experiential backgrounds of all Authority engineer trainees were 
thoroughly examined prior to selection for overseas training to ensure 
a close match between training course requirements and objectives and 
trainee experience. The USBR was careful to tailor the training programs 
to match the individual work situations and areas of concern as put forward 
by the Authority in conjunction with the individual engineer. The training 
course syllabi were based to an extent on experience and intuitive analyses 
of the desired behavioural objectives as well as the recognition that failure 
to tailor courses was unlikely to yield successful results in the intermediate 
and long t e rms . [ l l j 
The numbers involved and the training programs envisaged by both 
the Authority and the Bureau changed dramatically in a relatively short 
period of time, from the point where two or three of the Authority's bright 
young engineers would be trained to gain experience in the Bureau's 
methods[12j, through the Authority's preparedness to send up to twelve 
engineers for training[13j, to the point where there was an acceptance 
that training would take place during the period of time that the Bureau 
provided technical assistance to the Scheme.[l^J The overriding concern 
being that the training program as finally determined between the Bureau 
and the Liaison Engineer was of fundamental interest to the Authority 
and that it was undesirable to sacrifice diversity of training to expediency 
for a particular project.[15j 
Having determined the training programs for each of the selected 
trainees, these being directly related to the Authority projects being undertaken 
at the time, the trainees were counselled on their obligations and the 
Authority's expectations of their behaviour and performance. They were 
expected to display the utmost diligence to their work and familiarise 
themselves with all phases of the work on which they were engaged. They 
were instructed to pay particular attention to all aspects of design including 
basic assumptions, loading conditions, and other special requirements because 
on their return to Australia that knowledge would materially aid in carrying 
out the works to their successful completion.[16j 
The first Liaison Engineer, Pinkerton, arrived in Washington on 15 
November 1951, and following discussions with the Foreign Activities 
Section of the Bureau and officers of the Australian Embassy in Washington 
proceeded to Denver on 22 November 1951. The first group of four trainees 
arrived in Denver on the same day and took up duties at the Bureau on 
26 November 1951, ten days after the execution of the Agreement.[17j 
The orientation program for these trainees (Messrs McConnell, Hunter, 
Wilkin and Williamson) lasted five days and included introductions to senior 
staff; a tour of the engineering laboratories; discussions on hydrology, 
project planning, engineering geology, development of hydro electrical 
projects and hydraulic machinery; location selection and design of dams; 
a lecture and slide presentation on problems of grouting; an explanation 
and tour of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project; and "the inevitable publicity 
photographs".(p. 1 )[8J 
All four trainees were civil engineers and as mentioned, training 
programs were specially developed for each individual. A.McConnell trained 
in earth dams (3 months), spillways and outlets (3 months), materials laboratory 
(1 month), and field assignments (1 month). 3. Williamson trained in spillways 
and outlets (3 months), structures and tunnels (3 months), large gates and 
valves (3 months), hydraulics laboratory (1 month), and field assignment 
(2 months). W. Wilken trained in foundations and grouting (3 months), 
concrete dams (3 months), steel pipes and penstocks (3 months), concrete 
laboratory (1 month), and field assignment (2 months), and 3. Hunter trained 
in concrete dams months), field assignment at Canyon Ferry (3 months) 
and field inspection and special assignments (1 month).[19j 
The second group of trainees comprising Messrs D. Walsh, R. Sanders, 
A. Hosking and L. Endersbee, arrived in Denver and commenced their 
respective training schedules on 21 February 1952. Walsh's program involved 
hydrology project planning (3 months), field assignment and inspection 
(2 months), and spillways (3 months); Sanders involved project planning 
(U months), field inspections (2 weeks) and concrete dams (3i months); 
Hosking spent 3^ months in engineering laboratories, 2 months on earth 
dams, 2 months on field assignments and inspection, and 2 weeks on special 
assignments; whilst Endersbee spent 6 months on tunnels and structures, 
3 months on earth dams and 3 months on field assignments and inspections. 
These training schedules were developed to permit the trainees to work 
on various phases of the design work for the Tumut Pond Dam and associated 
diversion systems.[20j Thus, in addition to gaining experience on general 
USBR projects and work practices, the trainees specifically spent time 
on relevant parts of the SMA project which at this early stage involved 
mainly civil and hydrology works. These were also the areas in which 
the Authority was most vulnerable from a resources point of view. 
This practice was true also of the third group of trainees who arrived 
in Denver during February 1932 with the following training schedules: 
L.W. Gilmour and B.G. Hely, construction administration, field construction 
with particular reference to supervision and administration of contracts, 
and production control and scheduling; I.P. Sargeant, project planning as 
related to the work carried out by the Authority's Investigations Division, 
concrete dams and bridges, and field inspections; and B.3. Hannon, studying 
power station layout and design. 
As the planning for the Scheme progressed and technical details for 
each section of the project were finalised with the assistance of the USBR 
technical advisors in Australia the requirements for training in 
different areas and disciplines were identified, and trainees were selected 
accordingly. The first mechanical engineer trainee R.S. Franzi arrived 
in Denver late in 1952 to train in the mechanical design of large gates 
and valves, low head gates, and for field training and inspections. He was 
accompanied by G F Millington, a structural engineer, who trained in hydraulic 
design including the specialised subjects of surge tank design, water hammer 
problems, and stability of hydraulic systems, the hydraulics laboratory, 
mechanical design of gates, valves, penstocks and pipes and inspection.[21J 
In addition his field assignment included office and design work in a regional 
off ice, the organisation structure decided upon by the Authority for construction 
of the Scheme.[22j During 1953 a further sixteen trainees left Australia 
for Denver to study in such areas as construction and contract supervision 
[23J, and administration, structural design, canal and project planning, 
materials testing (especially concrete and steel), sediment control, sampling 
technique and stream bed load movement.[2^J 
Between November 1951 and December 195^, kl of the Authority's 
engineers trained with the USBR and selected other US organisations as 
arranged by the USBR. Training periods varied usually between eight and 
twelve months, the latter period being for single trainees and the shorter 
period for married trainees since wives were discouraged from going to 
the USA with their husbands. Estimates indicate that the cost per man 
week of training during this period was L61.[25j 
Contracts for major civil works let during this period included Eucumbene-
Tumut Tunnel and Happy Jacks Dam, Tumut Pond Dam and Tumut 1 Pressure 
Tunnel, all let to Kaiser-Walsh-Perini-Raymond, a joint venture between 
four American companies with a contract value of $38m; Tumut 1 Power 
I l l 
Station, Pressure shafts and Tailwater Tunnel let to a French group of 
contractors with a value of $7.8m; Tumut 1 Power Station Generators 
(ASEA Electric (Aust) Pty Ltd, $2.2m); and Tumut 1 Power Station Turbines 
(English Electric Co. Ltd $1.7m).[26j 
As each of the contracts got under way there was an increased 
requirement for skilled engineers experienced in contract administration 
and supervision as well as the specialist disciplines associated with the 
various parts of the works in progress. 
Similarly as planning for new projects and the technical detail and 
specifications for them became more advanced the requirements for training 
varied, however the numbers being trained did not diminish. It was recognised 
that Australian engineers required training in less well known areas as 
well as the more common disciplines and techniques. As long as the USBR 
was preparing the majority of technical specifications, operating procedures 
and practices and instructions, it was considered that the Authority would 
benefit significantly from having engineers trained by the USBR on these 
projects and in USER methodology. 
By 1958 the training thrust was noticeably broader due to the changing 
styles of construction and the progress towards finalising some of the contracts 
thus necessitating completion of wiring, and operations, protection and 
control systems amongst others. Training now involved design of tunnels, 
power station design, specific hydrolography equipment including telemetering, 
hydrographie forecasting techniques and methods, power plant, electrical 
machinery and controls, and design of aqueducts. The training program 
for Mr R. Hilton, who left for Denver on 18 January 1958, provided a 
good example of the specialisation of some of this training. In the broad 
sense he was required to visit the USBR Earth Laboratory in Denver to 
study Bureau classification test procedures, hydraulic and structural test 
procedures, records systems, report writing and report production systems, 
and to study and report on all new equipment and techniques. Specific 
aspects of the program included the study of earth dam specification 
requirements, processing of construction control test results from the field 
and earth dam design, whilst in the Earth Dam Section; X-ray diffraction 
of clays, selection of rock for rip-rap, rockfill, e tc , and general petrography 
in the Pétrographie Laboratory; and the observation of earthwork operations 
on large cuts and fills, and the placement, compaction and test operations 
on base and surface courses of flexible pavements whilst at tached to the 
California State Highway Department based in Sacramento.[27j 
This increasing specialisation was increasingly evident in trainee 
training a f te r this t ime as a result both of the major contracts let and 
subsequent work on them, and as a result of the finalisation of design 
parameters for the other works to be carried out in the Upper Tumut stage 
and the remainder of the Scheme. Whilst trainees still undertook studies 
in the civil engineering disciplines increasing emphasis was being placed 
on the electr ical and mechanical disciplines and aspects of the operations 
and control of the Scheme. 
This was exemplified by training programs of Messrs C.W. Walker 
(1958) and R.H. McKay (1959). Mr Walker, an electrical engineer, spent 
9 months in the USA studying in the field of automatic high speed single 
phase and three phase reclosure of transmission lines and of load and frequency 
control.[28j This period included periods of t ime with both the Bonneville 
Power Administration, and the Ontario Hydro-electric Power Commission. 
Mr McKay, a mechanical engineer, undertook not only training with 
the USBR in mechanical engineering design and field construction, but 
also undertook witness testing of Tucker sno-cats and other over-snow 
vehicles in Oregon, the observation of snow clearing practices and equipment 
(with the Colorado Highway Department), and factory instruction on engines 
and transmissions of caterpillar (Peoria, Illinois) and Allis-Chalmers (Springfield, 
Illinois) heavy tractor and grader equipment.[29j 
Thus as the technology required for the achievement of the optimum 
solutions to specific situations varied with the situations, so too did the 
training. 
Eucumbene and Tooma Dams, the contracts for which were let in 
May 1936 and May 1958 respectively, were earthfill dams, and the training 
required by the Authority for its engineers on these projects differed from 
the training required for its engineers on later dams which were concrete 
arch (Tumut Pond), and concrete gravity (Tumut 2, Tantangara, and Happy 
Jacks) dams. 
From the commencement of the traineeship scheme in November 
1951 until its cessation in January 1962, 108 Authority officers undertook 
formal in-service training with the USBR. This training was designed as 
far as possible to match the experience and abilities of the trainees and 
the role that was expected of them on their return to Australia. 
Whilst everything did not go entirely smoothly with the traineeship 
program, the trainees and the Authority did obtain major benefits from 
it. The trainees gained experience in USBR techniques, practices and 
procedures, and acquired knowledge specific to design, planning, construction 
and operation techniques. They learned how to adapt these techniques 
and systems to the conditions existing in the Snowy.[30j Their contact 
with Bureau officers also assisted in a direct communications flow at an 
individual level. The Authority benefitted from the program, certainly 
because it received back highly trained s taff , but also because the trainees 
worked on Authority design issues whilst with the Bureau. The Authority 
also gained additional benefit from the trainees' experience with the Bureau 
because their exposure lessened the typical resistance to change which 
occurs when technology comes from an external source. 
The Bureau also received a benefit from having the trainees work 
with them because the trainees undertook Bureau work including design 
whilst still being paid by the Authority. In fact the trainees did Authority 
and other work for the Bureau whilst they were being paid a salary and 
the Bureau was being paid to complete the design work, both paid by the 
Authority. 
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THE ROLE OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE 
One of the pre-requisites for successful technology transfer is an 
ef fec t ive system for ensuring that the information flows between the possessor 
of technology and the user of that technology. This delivery system or 
infrastructure has been described as the key linking network or vehicle 
between the producers and users of technology.[lJ 
The infrastructure functions to bring perceived or articulated user 
needs to the attention of funders and research producers, and in turn delivers 
research results or technology to meet stated user requirements. One 
way of understanding how the infrastructure works is to follow the studies 
of Anyos.[2j His model highlights the various functions of the infrastructure 
by broadly defining the four categories of participants in the delivery systems 
of industrialised nations as being funders or entrepreneurs, research and 
development producers, linking agents or brokers, and users. 
Funders or Entrepreneurs occur in both public and private organisations 
that provide financial resources for the development or adoption of tech-
nologies. In the USA this role is taken primarily by Federal Government 
Agencies such as NASA, and large private sector producers such as IBM, 
GM and AT & T. In the context of the Snowy Mountains Scheme it is 
clear that the funder of the original research was the US Government 
via its agency, the USBR. The Australian Government paid for the use 
of this technology but should not be considered a funder in this sense. 
Similarly, the Australian Government and the Snowy Mountains Scheme 
could not be considered "research and development producers", a category 
which includes government laboratories, universities, research institutions 
and private research and development activities, for even though the SMA 
conducted model simulation and other tests in its scientific services laboratories 
(see chapter 6), the primary research and development was carried out by 
the USBR, funded entirely from US Budget allocations. 
It is not until the categories of "Linking Agents or Brokers" and 
"Users" are considered that the involvement of the Australian Government 
and the SMA becomes clearer. 
Anyos' third category "Linking Agents or Brokers" include those public 
or private organisations or individuals that expedite the movement or diff-
usion of technology within or across national boundaries. These include 
functional interest groups, professional organisations, trade associations, 
consultants, and any others who work to utilise new technologies on existing 
problems. It is the broker's role to identify applications within the public 
and private sectors. Of course brokers need to recognise that utilisation 
usually involves modifications and adaptation to meet the expressed needs 
of the user. 
The Australian Government, based on recommendations from officers 
of the SMA and the relevant Ministers, acted as the Linking Agent or Broker 
through identification of the stock of technology available to it from within 
the USBR. This role was continued by becoming party to the assistance 
Agreement, and by guaranteeing that resources would be available and 
expended to cover the costs of accumulating and organising the information. 
These resources which were originally estimated at between LI66 million 
and LI83 million [3j (which included transmission) and subsequently adjusted 
to between L170 m and L200 m [^J were made available by successive 
Australian Governments following borrowings from the International Bank 
totall ing some L20^ m.[5j These figures re f lec t original es t imates for 
the to ta l Scheme (not just the Upper Tumut works), and were again finally 
adjusted to to ta l $800m. [6J 
The Government charged interest on this loan at a ra te equal to 
the long te rm bond ra te (originally 3 1/8%) and repayable over a period 
of 70 years f rom annual charges associated with the production of electr ici ty 
paid by the States of NSW and Victoria and the Commonwealth in proportion 
to their ent i t lements to electr ical energy. 
The amount provided for the development and adaptation of appro-
pr ia te technologies through the USBR was $3.3 m for the period 16 November 
1951 to 30 3une 1971.[7j These charges represent USBR assistance in 
te rms of designs and specifications, operating records and instructions, 
construction drawings, training of Authority s t a f f , USER advisors a t tached 
to the Scheme in Australia, and model development testing and simulation. 
At the same t ime the Authority acted as a Linking Agent/Broker 
through the provision in Denver of Liaison Officers who were either engineers 
or administrators . This service was pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Agree-
ment[8j which provided for the maintenance in Denver of a Liaison Engineer 
as the Authority representat ive to co-ordinate technical phases of the 
work being performed by the USBR including the training program. This 
Engineer was to be assisted by an Administrative Officer responsible for 
all administrat ive mat te r s related to the maintenance and well being of 
the engineer t rainees assigned to training duties in the USA. This original 
recommendation was however modified so that there were not always two 
liaison persons in Denver at the same t ime. In the period 13 November 
1951, when Mr I.L. Pinkerton the first Liaison Engineer arrived, to February 
1962 when the Denver off ice was closed, twelve Authority officers acted 
in a liaison capacity, usually for a period of some 12 months.[9j 
This requirement by the USBR to establish appropriate co-ordination 
mechanisms with Denver was based on their experience that the sending 
of papers, specifications, and procedures do not of themselves facil i tate 
e f fec t ive transfer. To transfer know-how, much of which is not written 
down, there is frequently no substitute for person to person training and 
assistance. 
The role of the liaison representative went further than merely co-
ordinating the relevant training programs, for often these programs were 
varied at short notice to take advantage of specialised training and inspections 
of USBR and other facilities which arose on an 'ad hoc' basis but which 
were of benefit to the trainee and the Scheme. Variation also occurred 
from time to time to match specific situations which occurred in Australia 
a f te r the trainees had departed for the USER in Denver. 
In addition it fell to these liaison officers to provide the necessary 
administrative and personal support so often necessary with overseas training. 
These functions included security and customs clearances, entry visas, 
accommodation, banking and pay details, travel both within the USA and 
return to Australia, counselling, progress reports on training and a range 
of other minor services including telephone connection and rental payment, 
and provision of cutlery and linen for the rented apartments. 
Some of the trainees remained in the USA at various times to take 
over the duties of Liaison Officer . This added another dimension to their 
training by virtue of exposure to the administrative requirements of maintaining 
the training scheme as well as exposure to the broader administrative 
aspects of the USBR systems of operation including style, procedures and 
practices, filing systems, referencing, paper flow, and decision making 
processes. These concepts and practices returned with them to the Authority. 
Of the Liaison Officers who served in the USA, most went on to 
senior administrative or engineering positions within the Authority on their 
return. Mr K.E. Andrews, who was in the USA from October 1953 to 3uly 
became an Associate Commissioner, and Mr P.G. Collins, October 
1956 to September 1957, went on to become Associate and then Acting 
Commissioner of the Authority. 
The final category in this model refers to "Users", i.e. those who 
benefit directly from the transfer of a given technology, usually the private 
industrial sector, and those who benefit indirectly, the ultimate user or 
consumer of the product or the technology. 
The User assists in the delivery of technology by still further adapting 
the technology for other uses, as well as those uses for which it was originally 
t ransferred. Continued useage and modification reinforces the appropriateness 
of choice of technology and effectiveness of transfer. Of course in the 
case under consideration it would have been most surprising if the users 
of the technology had indeed not utilised it for the purposes for which 
it was intended. 
Whilst the above model is useful in understanding some aspects of 
the role of infrastructure in technology transfer, it is less useful when 
examining the role of the structure and management of an agency responsible 
for the successful transfer of technology which does not conveniently fit 
into one of its four categories. This is the case with the SMA. 
Characteristically, the transfers of technology to developing countries 
are "new track transfers"(p.l l)[10j, that is, the new technology cannot be 
transferred without modification into an existing activity. In order for 
the new track to be utilised there must be brought into being an institutional, 
technical and cultural infrastructure as a context for organisation and 
operation. Such an organisation or institution is according to Strassmann[l IJ, 
one of the determinants of the success or failure of technology transfer. 
The Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Authority was created in order 
to achieve the successful construction of the Scheme by whatever means 
and utilising whatever methods it could within the provisions of its enabling 
legislation. As has been seen it was quickly recognised that there were 
insufficient trained and experienced engineers in Australia at the inception 
of the Scheme's development and that to undertake the necessary design 
and planning to satisfy the t imeframes for development within Australia 
was clearly impracticable. An appropriate organisational structure thus 
had to be developed that would facil i tate the transfer of technology via 
USBR design, development and other technical assistance from the USA, 
the training of Authority engineers in the USA, and USBR advisers attached 
to the Scheme as well as carry out the planning and construction of the 
Scheme. 
In this situation the Australian governnnent was again to use the 
experiences of the USA. According to Wettenhall[12j, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority was used an an exemplar in a number of ways leading up to the 
creation of the SMA. These included: 
(i) "The NSW Parliament received a special report on it a f te r an over-
seas visit by the State Premier in 19^3; 
(ii) the legislation creating the TVA and the lawsuits by which it had 
been challenged were the subject of a special study by the so 
called Officers Committee under the chairmanship of the Federal 
Director-General of Works, Dr L.F.Loder; 
(iii) there was much further discussion of the TVA experience when 
the bill to create SMA was before the Federal parliament; and 
(iv) it was no accident that the t i t le 'Authority' was used rather than 
the more familiar 'Commission' or 'Board'."(p.87) 
The TVA set up in 1933 by the US Federal Government covered 
the complete Tennessee Valley watershed, covering 000 square miles 
and including portions of seven states[13j. It was established as part 
of President Roosevelt's "New Deal" programme, and was justified to the 
US Congress by its defense functions and capacities. In commending the 
creating legislation to Congress, he indicated he was seeking a corporation: 
". . clothed with the power of government but possessed of the 
flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise," 
(and) 
. charged with the broadest duty of planning for the proper use, 
conservation, and development of the natural resources of the 
Tennessee River drainage basin and its adjoining territory for the 
general social and economic welfare of the Nation . ."(p.^9)[l^J 
By the late 19^0s the TV A had won world wide acclaim for its 
achievements in the development of the region encapsulated in its legislation. 
Social studies were also beginning to suggest that the corporate dedication 
to, and consideration of, the interests of the people of the region were 
more than compensating for the loss of direct external Government control 
that arose from its operation as a public corporation.[15j Needless to 
say the TVA utilised the services of the USBR during its construction and 
development stages. Its charter, structure and role was such that it was 
receptive to the technical knowledge, techniques and information flows 
from the technological stock possessed by the USBR. 
The success of the TVA and the role played by the Government 
in its development were not lost on some Australians. Casey[16j described 
it in 19^9 as a development stimulator, commenting that: 
"Certain forms of Government activity can play a most valuable 
part in stimulating private enterprise . . . Lord Keynes has said that 
the sphere of Government is not in doing something that is already 
being done - and doing it a little better or a little worse - but in 
doing those things that are not now being done at all . . . Future 
TVA's may well have nothing to do with flood control or the generation 
of electricity - but the valuable thing that America has taught us 
is the idea behind TVA - that the creation of conditions under which 
the energy and the creative imagination of countless individuals can 
be released, so that they can get a move on." (p.7) 
That the SMA was established as an Authority and not as a department 
of the executive government (or ministerial department) allowed it greater 
flexibility in financing, staffing, procurement and other elements of admini-
stration than was possible under conventional machinery. This ensured 
that it was capable of being a sufficiently powerful agency of action and co-
ordination[17j to assist rather than act as a barrier to, the intake of superior 
technology. 
The Authority's organisation structure was headed by a Commissioner[18j 
and two Associate Commissioners who were directly responsible for the 
five engineering groups which comprised Investigations (Engineering and 
Economic), Civil Engineering Design and Scientific Services, Major Contracts, 
Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, and Field Construction, and two 
service groups comprising Finance and Administration, and Stores and 
Supply.[19j 
The initial ideas presented for each project were examined by the 
Investigations Group engineers. After a general feasibility study, a broad 
outline of the work was programmed and preliminary investigation begun. 
Economics were carefully examined and alternative propositions developed 
following which further investigations were undertaken in greater detail. 
These included the collection of data on stream flow, climatological conditions, 
snow cover, water quality and sediment concentration, and entailed field 
surveys, aerial photography, photogrammetry, map-making, geological exploration 
and drilling for geological core. Obviously, the more information that 
could be obtained at this stage the more comprehensive and more soundly 
based would be the preliminary designs. 
The information thus obtained was then usually consolidated in report 
form in which the general overall design of the project was suggested. 
After further examination a particular general design was adopted and 
the work taken to the next stage of its development. 
Working within the scope of the general design, the Civil Design 
and Scientific Services Group engineers and scientists produced detailed 
designs of the various sections of the project. This often necessitated 
fur ther scientific studies covering such fields as soil analysis, weld-parameters, 
model studies of water flow and river bed movement, concrete studies, 
and so forth. Many of the engineering problems which emerged at this 
stage and also in the earlier investigation stage were solved by utilising 
the Authority's General Electric System 225 computer facilities. 
During this stage, work began on detailed estimates and cost analyses, 
and on the preparation of tender documents and specifications. The Authority 
called on the services of its consultants, the USBR, to act as engineering 
auditors, which ensured that the work was based on sound engineering 
and technical practices. 
As the final designs were approved, the Civil Design and Scientific 
Services Group prepared the detailed contractual drawings and documents. 
Contracts were advertised, and tenders received and examined. The contracts 
were then placed with civil construction organisations. 
Due to the magnitude of many of the contracts (some of which exceeded 
$^0 million in value), this contract work involved the employment mainly 
of overseas contractors, but most of the staff and all the working teams 
were Australian residents, many of them new migrants. In order to reduce 
the t ime of construction, the Authority's planning was based on its own 
field construction forces undertaking the building of access roads to the 
project sites, the provision of initial accommodation for the contractor 's 
work force and the supply of power for construction purposes. 
The Field Construction Division was therefore responsible for road con-
struction and heavy plant necessary for this work and for erection and main-
tenance of accommodation on the works sites. It also controlled the Authority's 
three a i rcraf t , which had a total seating capacity of 23, and which were 
used for the rapid transportation of personnel and supplies. The aircraft 
were also used extensively in aerial survey work. 
The Major Contracts Group was responsible for the management, 
co-ordination and supervision of major civil engineering contracts. These 
engineers collaborated closely with the design engineers in ensuring that 
technical adequacy and proper engineering standards were maintained during 
the course of the contract work. Since the start of major contract work, 
this group supervised the construction of contracts worth over $^00 million 
by the late 1960s. 
In hydro-electric engineering it is customary for the civil works 
to be separated from mechanical and electrical works insofar as contractual 
work is concerned. The Electrical & Mechanical Group, however, worked 
closely with the civil design engineers in design, cost es t imates , material 
e s t imates and equipment specifications for the electr ical and mechanical 
plant installed in civil works. This group was also responsible for the 
installation of the plant and for the operation of the Authority's power 
producing installations and systems not under the control of the Snowy 
Mountains Council - the body responsible for the general operation of the 
Scheme's power stat ions. 
The Finance and Administration Group was responsible for the analysis, 
appraisal, development and administrat ive organisation, methods and general 
procedures for the e f f ec t ive control of f inance and administration throughout 
the Scheme. In addition it provided protect ive services, medical and legal 
services and general printing faci l i t ies as well as transport control of a 
large f lee t of vehicles and general services to the other groups. 
Finally, the of f icers of the Stores and Supply Division were responsible 
for the purchase of all supplies and for the disposal of surplus stores and 
equipment. Their duties include arrangements for import licences, custom 
clearances and duty refunds. 
The aim of this s t ructure was to pinpoint responsibility for progress 
and expenditure on each item of the works to one of the above groups 
i r respect ive of where the work was carried out and at the same t ime to 
ensure tha t there was economical co-ordination of all work being carried 
out in any one location. 
To fulfi l l these requirements the functional form of organistion was 
adopted whereby the responsibility of each group was explicitly defined. 
Wherever the function of that group was exercised, the methods and procedures 
were in accordance with the direction of that group. For co-ordination 
of work within any region, a Regional Engineer or administrative officer 
was appointed to exercise functions which, to a large extent, were similar 
to those of the Authority (Commissioner) for the whole of the Scheme. 
Responsibilities thus included general discipline, adequacy of accommodation 
and meals, co-ordination of transport, and overall utilisation of labour. 
This bureaucratic structure closely paralleled the structure of the USBR 
with its high degree of structure of activities including the division of 
work into specialist jobs, the establishment of routines and procedures 
and the formalisation of them in written record,[20j the concentration 
of authority, and the control of workflow by line as opposed to staff 
personnel.[21J 
Mention was made in the discussion of the Anyos Model[22j, of the 
role of the Authority's Scientific Services Laboratories which whilst not 
being regarded as prime research and development producers played an 
important role in the successful transfer of technology from the USBR. 
These laboratories fulfilled three main functions: the elimination as far 
as possible of the unknown or unforeseeable conditions inherent in all projects, 
such as dam foundations and power station excavations; control over the 
quality of materials and workmanship; and the preparation of the grounds 
for the application of advanced engineering techniques to the design and 
construction of structures.[23j The types of work undertaken to fulfill 
these functions included the investigations of geology and construction 
materials during the planning stage of the projects, the use of scientific 
methods and model studies to find solutions to design problems when these 
could not be solved by mathematical analyses, and the application of quantity 
and quality control tests to construction materials and workmanship. The 
high standard of these facilities were such that the laboratories were registered 
by the National Association of Testing Authorities in several fields.[2^J 
In addition to the provision of special services, e.g. photographic 
facil it ies and model and instrument workshops, the laboratories also provided 
training for specialised personnel such as inspectors, hydrographers and 
survey staf f , and post graduate training for engineers and other professional 
s taf f . Many of the staff of the Scientific Services Division which included 
the Laboratories, had been trained by the USBR under the traineeship 
program (mentioned in chapter 7) in the professional techniques, analysis, 
documentation and methods which they used as the basis for training the 
other personnel mentioned above. 
The centralised location of the laboratories, within easy access of 
both the head off ice and the field construction operation, followed the 
USBR practice, and was an important factor in ensuring the successful 
understanding and integration of operations. It resulted for example in 
the design engineers being able to observe model experiments being carried 
out in the laboratories on their behalf. Similarly construction engineers 
kept closely in touch with tests on cements, sails, steels and other construction 
materials. An important outworking of this centralised location was the 
e f fect ive exchange of information, and increased interest and confidence 
that built up between the laboratories engineers and scientists on the one 
hand and the design and construction engineers on the other. This exchange 
was further enhanced by the presence and participation of the USBR advisers. 
The elements of the Anyos model can be seen to be present within 
the SMA. However the important role played by the infrastructure in ternns 
of its assistance to the technology transfer process is better understood 
by emphasising the elements within the delivery system such as finance, 
the holders of the stock of knowledge, the organisational structure of the 
Authority, the interaction between the various parts of the structure, and 
the individuals within the system. There is no doubt that without an effect ive 
infrastructure or delivery system, the transfer of technology from the 
USBR to Australia and from the initial point of contact to other aspects 
of the Scheme would not have been as successful. 
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CONCLUSION 
The foundations for the acceptance of a development such as the 
Scheme may be found in the Commonwealth Government's position with 
regard to its post war reconstruction responsibilities. Reconstruction is 
not a single subject in itself but rather goes to the aspirations of the community 
for a bet ter way of l i fe , and thus involves the whole complex of social, 
economic and political arrangements of that community.[ lJ 
As early as 19^3 Prime Minister Chifley [2 j was announcing that 
the f irst duty of the Government must be to the men and women of the 
fighting forces . In order to address that duty and provide new jobs for 
them and munition workers, primary production based on potential markets 
at home and abroad had to be rehabilitated. Farmers had to be given 
stabil i ty of income, farming methods had to be made more e f f i c ient , and 
secondary production capacity had also to be increased. The principal 
mat ters in this program were water conservation and the extension of 
e l e c t r i c a l fac i l i t ies . [3 j 
The decentralisation of munitions production in which more than 
L l l million had been spent in over 35 Regional centres providing factories , 
plant and jobs for the local population was cited as an example of the 
benef i ts to be gained[^J This base on which peace t ime act ivit ies could 
build for the advancement of Australia was said to be dependent on the 
supply and distribution of e l e c t r i c power. 
When the proposals for the development of the Scheme first formally 
c a m e to the notice of the Government in 19^6 [5] it was recognised that 
such a scheme could significantly assist the process of reconstruction, 
and that in view of Australia's limited water resources, the final decision 
on the use of the river system had to ensure the maximum benefit for 
Australia generally. In releasing a report on the diversion of the Snowy 
River, Lemmon commented that by exploiting the full potentialities of 
the Snowy River the shortages of power that existed in New South Wales 
and Victoria and the need to provide for rapidly increasing demand brought 
about by continuous industrial development, could be met. If these poten-
tiali t ies were met, power for NSW and Victoria would be ensured well 
into the future , as would water and thus an extension of the existing irrigation 
systems. 
In his address to Parliament, which was widely reported in the media, 
Chifley[6j announced that proposals to divert the Snowy River only recently 
discussed with the various State Premiers were ". . . of such magnitude, 
and of such great national interest . . ."(p.32)[7j that they had to be discussed 
forthwith. Not only because such a development would be very costly, 
but also because the proposals would mean the production of power at 
half the cost of coal stations, less amounts of expendable coal would be 
used, more water would be supplied, and the power would be produced 
away from the cities so that key industries and research requiring considerable 
power could be undertaken in relative security. He went on to remind 
people tha t : 
"One of the Commonwealth Government's early policy decisions was 
that dealing with the decentralisation of industry. Cheap reliable power 
provided in congenial country areas would provide an incentive to de-
central ise industries especially those dependent on agricultural pursuits. 
A scheme so vast and so beneficial is a national asset in the fullest 
sense of the word. It would be one of the greatest projects in the 
history of Australia's development. . ."(p.32)[8j 
Following Cabinet approval on 22 May 19^9, Chifley [9J announced 
that legislation would be introduced to Parliament enabling the establishment 
of the Snowy Scheme, a two-sided plan providing for vast supplies of new 
power and the immense decentralisation of industry and population. 
Reconstruction and development activities aimed at improving the 
national economy and the lifestyles and welfare of the community at large, 
are never costless. In the final analysis a Government has to strike a balance 
[lOj between the often non-quantifiable environmental and social values, 
and relatively straight forward economic values. 
In the planning of most major developments, at least in recent times, 
some assessment of the economic viability or cost-benefit , has played 
a role in the final decision to proceed or not. The objective of cost benefit 
analysis is to determine whether the benefits derived from a project outweigh 
the costs incurred. In order to achieve this objective, the costs and benefits 
have first to be identified, and then ascribed a monetary value. One criticism 
of cost benefit analysis is that not all costs and benefits can be or are 
identified, nor can they always be quantified. As well as the direct costs 
and benefits, a number of other factors have an impact on the analysis; 
these include the t ime period adopted, the discount rate selected, the 
decision cri teria, external costs and social costs as well as a number of 
background assumptions, both stated and unstated. All these factors require 
a judgement to be made, often on lit t le or no evidence, but once they 
have been expressed numerically and then manipulated according to formal 
rules they tend to be assigned an objectivity and certainty.[ lIJ 
The first comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the Schenne was 
contained in the Final Report by the Commonwealth and State Officers, 
1950.[12J Prior to this, earlier assessments appear to have taken the form 
of suggested benefit s ta tements with little indication of the indices, tests 
and measurements on which projections were based. Figures had been 
produced of course for the various State Committees and the Joint Working 
Part ies prior to announcements in Parliament of the benefits of the Scheme, 
however it was pointed out that whilst the degree of accuracy was ample 
for preliminary studies it was . . by no means adequate for the complete 
designing of the development. . ."(p.^l)[13j. Notwithstanding these types 
of cautions it was announced in Parliament that the Scheme could irrigate 
an additional 300 000 acres for a gross annual return in the value of food 
s tuffs of at least L20 million, and ultimately 750 000 horsepower [l^J, 
with a consequent saving of expendable coal reserves. Differing initial 
proposals lead to differing costs and benefits being described, however 
in introducing the Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Power Bill to Parliament 
in 19^9, it was stated that the Scheme would ensure annual production 
of some 1 720 000 kW, almost as much as the total capacity of all power 
stations in Australia at that time.[15j Moreover it was stated that this 
power could be produced at about half the cost of thermal power generation 
representing a saving of ^ million tons of coal per year or about one third 
of the output at that time.[16j In addition to the power component, 1.8 
million acre fee t of water would be made available, equal to some three 
to four times the amount then used in the Leeton-Griffith irrigation area.[17j 
In their statistics for the recommended developments, the Committee 
of Commonwealth and State Officers put forward information based on 
figures which had not been definitely established, and were preliminary 
and indicative in nature. With regard to power generation, whilst it was 
intended that the Scheme would work in conjunction with steam (thermal) 
stations in the States, the economic unit of capacity had not been completely 
studied . .due to the limited time available and to the lack of data and 
staff . . ."(p.29)[18j These tentative values for maximum demand and 
installed capacities were used however to assist in the determination of 
the costs and economics of the proposal. Tumut 1 Power Station was 
given the approximate figures of average head of 980 feet, an average 
flow of 1,250 cusecs, an installed capacity of 320 000 kW, an average 
output of 86 000 kW and a load factor on installaed capacity of 27%, whilst 
Tumut 2 Power Station was accorded the approximate corresponding figures 
of 920 feet, 1320 cusecs, 320 000 kW, 85 000 kW, and 27% load factor.[19J 
A similar situation was stated to exist with regard to the benefits 
and availability of increased water resources. A close determination of 
the total extra water available for irrigation in the Murrumbidgee and 
Murray Valleys was not made because of " . . . a shortage of time and 
staff"(p.30).[20j However even with additional data on the monthly diversions 
to the Murray and Tumut Rivers made available by the Hydro-Electric 
Sub-Committee, a considerable amount of work was stated to remain ". . . 
to determine how effective the proposed storages will be in regulating 
the water for irrigational use and whether any additional storage will be 
necessary."(p.30)[21j. The average water available each year due to diversions 
alone to the Murrumbidgee was estimated to be 565,000 acre-feet per 
year of extra new water whilst the total average extra water available 
for irrigation use (by both diversion and regulation) was tentatively approximated 
at 1 ^00 000 acre feet per year [22j in the Murrumbidgee Valley. These 
figures apply only to the Tumut Proposal. The total Scheme statistics 
being 2 620 000 kW of power production and 2 300 000 acre fee t of extra 
water for irrigation.[23j 
Costing for construction of the Scheme was not frequently raised in 
the Parliament however the figures of L65m [ 2 H t l 6 6 m [25], and LI83m 
[26j were mentioned at various times. The calculation of these costs was 
based on fairly rudimentary information and varied according to the alternative 
being put. For example, the costs of diversion of the Snowy to the Murray 
River as finally put to the Government were based on the proposed diversion 
costs of the Murrumbidgee which were first prepared in 1939, updated 
in 19^^ by simply adding 30% to the civil engineering construction items 
generally and again in 19^7 by re-estimating at the then current rates 
for the cost of power stations and transmission lines, but not re-doing 
the whole calculation. The estimates were reviewed in 19^9 to reflect 
the considerable increase in the costs of labour and materials. The Committee 
also expressed the view that: 
"Any increases in costs due to rising price levels may be expected to 
be accompanied by similar increases in the value of power, thus the 
economic comparison should be more or less unaffected". (p.32)[27j 
The rates used for the estimates for the dams as with other civil engineering 
works, were increased in 19^8 by a notional 33% above the rate and 
by 75% above those of 1939.[28J 
The a t tempts to provide a cost-benefit analysis for the Scheme highlight 
many of the problems associated with such an analysis. All the costs and 
benefits cannot be known, included or measured. In particular consideration 
of environmental and social welfare factors are almost impossible to quantify 
1^0 
whilst still having a significant bearing on a decision to invest in a particular 
project . In fac t it could be argued that it is impossible to ascribe values 
to costs and benefi ts at all, since they lie in the realm of conjecture rather 
than an objective scientific exercise. This is particularly so in the case 
of the defense considerations and arguments put forward in support of 
construction of the Scheme. 
The use of cost-benefi t analysis in technology assessment is really 
a political ac t and as Johnston says "produces a spurious mathematical 
precision for very imprecisely known relationships".(p.l20)[29j It is thus 
apparent that the rationale for building the Scheme included a large component 
tha t was not quantifiable. Indeed much of it had to do with the psychological 
values to the nation of inspiration and confidence, especially as they related 
to the momentum of the national economy, and the provision of jobs. 
Information relating to the costs and benefits of the Scheme is documented 
in a number of di f ferent sources and is at least capable of some degree of 
analysis as shown by those who question the economic rationale for the 
Scheme's construction and existence.[30j This information is however retro-
spective, achieved by at tempting to measure now those benefits only predicted 
prior to and during construction, and costs which utilise different methodologies 
and fac tors to the original. 
Just as the analysis of the Scheme's costs and benefits provides some 
insights into the rationale behind the Scheme, a similar examination of the 
significant but l i t t le acknowledged role played by the USBR may prove 
insightful. A cost-benefi t analysis of the role of the USBR is however 
a far more difficult exercise especially given the lack of recognition of 
the role they played. Apart from acknowledgements and comments contained 
in Annual Reports of the Authority until the la te 1950s, no other documenta-
tion on the Scheme has made more than a f leeting reference to, or acknow-
lege of, the contribution made by the Bureau. 
It is not generally well understood that when the Authority was 
brought into being it had to face up to an immense amount of detailed 
investigation and design work, a task which was est imated to take well 
over 100 engineers some years to complete.[31J 
On the establishment of the Authority a decision had to be made 
which of two courses would be followed. Would it on the one hand concentra te 
on investigation and defer construction for two or three years until designs 
had reached an advanced stage, or on the other, carry out investigations 
and preliminary construction work concurrently. It is history now that 
the la t te r course was adopted. 
In the original documentation supporting the use of the USBR it was 
s ta ted that by them undertaking the design of the Upper Tumut groups 
of works, to the s tage of compilation of specifications and contract drawings 
so tha t cont rac ts could be let . Authority staff could then concentra te 
their e f f o r t s on work which would otherwise not have been completed 
for some t ime. Further their assistance was said to be an important fac tor 
in expediting the supply of blocks of power from the Scheme, and that 
the probable costs would be $250 000, but that this es t imate was very 
approximate.[32j 
1^2 
In reply to a question (from Casey) regarding the length of time 
until the Upper Tumut works were complete, Hudson sent an urgent telex 
advising that the normal program would take some 8-9 years giving about 
230 000 kW with the second station two years later bringing the total 
for the Upper Tumut work to about 500 000 kW. He further advised that 
as an urgent defence measure all U.T. works could be completed within 
six years by adopting unorthodox methods for placing overseas contracts. 
In continuing to stress the defence aspects he stated that power demand 
in combatant countries increased 50% during the early stages of World War 
2 and that if war broke out again in the next few years Australia would 
not be able to meet the increased power demands unless appropriate steps, 
including expediting the Tumut Works, were taken straight away.[33j 
This approach was supported by Casey who agreed that use of the 
USBR would allow the Scheme to go ahead faster on the design side and 
make it unnecessary for the Authority to recruit a large number of high 
level design s taf f . Although the USBR would do the work at cost, rates 
of pay were much higher in the USA than Australia, it was believed on 
net balance that the work would actually cost much less and would be 
done much quicker than the Authority could possibly do it. In supporting 
this approach both the practical and political importance of associating 
with a technical branch of the United States Government was stressed. 
It was stated that : 
". . . it is clear that any work undertaken by the USER would always 
be of exceptional value to us, quite apart from the rate at which the 
actual project itself may be carried out. The design work will always 
be an essential pre-requisite of the actual development work and we 
will save our available resources of Australian technical manpower 
if we can get the Americans to do this job for us".(p.l)[35j 
It was estimated that the total cost of the design work would not exceed 
$230 000, spread over two financial years. [36J 
As discussed in Chapter 5, it was agreed that the Bureau would 
carry out all design and specification for the Upper Tumut Works to the 
stage where construction tenders would be called (modified Scheme C) 
at a final estimated cost of $800 000. In this equation it should be remembered 
that a unit of work in Australia costing LI would cost $5 in America. 
[37j It was also agreed that the Technical Training Scheme would go ahead 
at an estimated total cost of some $80 000. However as early as 1953 
the Authority was seeking further assistance from the Bureau[38j, extending 
to the general review of the proposed layout, and design contract and 
construction drawings for large sections of the 12 project. This additional 
work was estimated at a further $375 000. During 1956 the Bureau was 
again requested to undertake additional work, this time in relation to the 
Eucumbene-Tumut Tunnel, and by the end of 1958 had undertaken still 
further work to the value of $2^5 500.[39J The majority of work covered 
two major peaks, 1953-^ and 1958-9, after which work dropped away signi-
ficantly. 
Notwithstanding the original intention to only involve the Bureau 
in the short term, the last accounts were received from them in the last 
quarter of 1970. The total cost of Bureau services, not including costs 
incurred in Australia, was $3 317 695.76.[^0j This sum included training, 
designs, specifications, records, contract drawings, operating criteria and 
instructions, analysis of data, model testing, observers, administrative 
overheads, liaison administration, and a special standing charge. The part ies 
ceased their formal arrangements in 197^ when the Bureau remit ted the 
remainder of its advance from the Authority ($1 555.67) following a request 
f rom Commissioner Dann. [ ^ I j This cessation of formal arrangements 
did not however diminish the range or r a te of informal contact between 
individuals at a number of d i f ferent levels within the respective organisations. 
Indeed these contacts , which are virtually impossible to quantify, are among 
the benef i ts to result from the involvement of the USBR. 
The benefi ts of utilising the services of the Bureau should be seen 
as applying at a number of d i f ferent levels. At the most obvious level 
the assistance of the USBR in the design of certain of the works enabled 
cont rac t s for parts of the Upper Tumut works to be advertised and placed 
a t least eighteen months to two years earlier than would otherwise have 
been possible, and tenders for the final construction were also able 
to be advanced.[^3j During this period of the 1930s shortages of appropriately 
skilled and experienced engineers and technical personnel were being experienced 
not only in Australia but worldwide, and: 
". . . the inability to a t t r a c t them to Australia would have had serious 
consequences (for the Authority) if not for the Bureau undertaking 
a large portion of the designs for the Upper Tumut works".(p.21)[^^J 
What was also obvious was the assistance given in what could be called 
hard copy, including drawings, designs and specifications; contractual 
documentation and procedures; writ ten operating and maintenance instructions 
and procedures; results of research and tests including model tests; wri t ten 
analysis of data , and crit iques and recommendations. The Authority still 
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utilises the operating and maintenance manuals, and calculations developed 
by the USBR, which provide the foundations for the day to day operations 
of the Scheme. Though these documents and analytic models have been 
rewrit ten under the Authority's banner, they draw almost exclusively on 
the original USBR documentation. The original, and fundamental design 
drawings too are maintained because they provide the base from which 
minor modification works drawings are produced. It should be noted however 
that there has been no significant modification to the design or operation 
of the Upper Tumut works to that which was originally specified by the 
Bureau. 
Advice from USBR personnel took both the formal and informal 
formats . Their formal advice often closely resembled instructions, but 
also went to written recommendations and suggestions. The emphasis 
on local management of projects and acceptance of responsibility by those 
on site, which was strongly argued for by the USBR consultants, and originally 
introduced during the construction of the Scheme, has recently been re-
introduced to the Authority. This followed a review by external management 
consultants who recommended that the existing matrix and corporate 
management styles were not appropriate for an organisation whose main 
areas of activity were decentralised, and thus should be administered by 
local management with support and advice from the head office.[45j 
Similarly, the use of the new form of contracts utilising a schedule 
of unit prices as opposed to the cost plus fixed fee type, was introduced 
largely at the behest of the USBR and proved to operate most effectively 
during the construction of the Scheme. This type of contract has now 
become the preferred model for civil construction contracts in Australia 
both because of its obvious benefits and because nnany of those who used 
this type of contract with the Scheme have gone on to do major civil and 
construction industry contract work both in Australia and overseas. This 
lat ter group includes such organisations as Thiess Brothers, John Holland 
Constructions, Concrete Industries (Monier), Humes Ltd, and Allied Con-
structions Pty Ltd. [^6J 
The Scheme also gained benefits both formally and informally from 
Authority trainees who studied in Denver. That they took copious notes 
and copies of relevant systems and procedures is beyond doubt. However 
they also benefitted from the unwritten guidance, counsel, suggestions 
and advice of Bureau s taff . Hudson commented on the fact that the train-
ing ". . . will be of inestimable value to the Authority . ."(p.l l)[^7j, and 
that . Bureau trained Authority engineers were able to assume greater 
responsibility for engineering design . (p.20)[^8j, thus allowing other 
more senior engineers to concentrate on more difficult construction related 
work. Thus the value of the training, both formal and informal, lay in 
its immediacy and ability to be repeated at any time. 
At the least obvious level, and the most difficult to specify, are the 
benefits gained by those who were exposed to the USBR's operating methods 
either directly or indirectly, including trainees, contractors and their employees, 
and Authority personnel, who as a result performed their work in a different 
and more effect ive manner. Mention has already been made of some of 
the construction contractors, however others which should be included 
are Electric Power Transmission (EPT) Pty Ltd., Standard Telephones and 
Cables Pty Ltd, Boving and Co Ltd., Clyde Engineering Co. Pty Ltd, Carrier 
Air Conditioning Ltd, Mining and General Engineering Ltd, O'Donnell 
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Griff in and Co. Pty Ltd, and Wormald Bros Pty Ltd.[¿f9j 3ust as it is very 
dif f icul t to t r a ce staff of these organisations who have gone to other newer 
construct ion and contract ing companies and taken their knowledge and 
skills with them, so too it is diff icul t to t r ace the whereabouts or present 
job areas and responsibilities of all those who worked on the Scheme and 
who were in all probability a f f ec t ed by the USBR pract ices or personnel 
in one way or another . Some technical s t a f f , including engineers who 
studied with the USBR in Denver have remained with the Authority to 
this day. These include Messrs F. Millner (Operations Planning Engineer), 
R. McKay (Main Plant Engineer), K. Montague (Senior Executive Engineer 
Corpora te Services), J . McLean (Investigations Engineer), R. Dawson (Executive 
Engineer Civil), G. Shelton (Technical Services Engineer), R. Goddard 
(Communications Systems Engineer), R. Warwick (Manager Maintenance 
Planning), and F. Crook (Branch Head, Mechanical Engineering Maintenance). 
Others who served with the Authority and trained with the USBR 
accepted positions with the Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation. 
These include Messrs D. Price (Managing Director), T. Lewis, R. Cameron 
and R. Neal (General Managers Operations), 3, Hilton (General Manager 
Engineering), R. Paton (General Manager Business Development), N. Carter 
(Manager Malaysia), M. Kotowicz (Manager Indonesia) and special consultants 
3. Cooke (large dams and hydro-electric projects), A. Frost (electrical 
and mechanical engineering), and 3. Hunter (civil engineering projects). 
By vir tue of their contact with USRB staff and working procedures, 
and the experience they gained on the Scheme, Authority staff as early 
as 1957 began to provide formal assistance to other Government bodies 
in Australia. These included a diamond drilling team to assist in field 
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investigations for the Cot ter Dam (ACT), as well as advice and hydraulic 
model experiments , and collection of hydrolographic data for the Humpty 
Doo Rice Project in the Northern Territory.[50j These consulting act ivi t ies 
remained and increased over the next f i f t een years until with the virtual 
completion of the Scheme the Australian Government established in 1970 
the internat ional consulting organisation, the Snowy Mountains Engineering 
Corporat ion, to retain the engineering skills and expertise built up during 
the t ime it took to investigate, design and construct the Scheme. 
SMEC has utilised this experience in electr ical , mechanical and civil 
engineering aspects of both surface and underground hydro-electric power 
stat ions in various parts of the world in schemes ranging from 100 kW 
capaci ty to those which incorporate 250 MW generating units. Their experience 
in the re la ted area of power transmission systems and substations covers 
all s tages f rom pre-feasibil i ty studies to the final commissioning for systems 
ranging f rom 11 kV to 330 kV, and includes expertise in the studies of 
system stabili ty, surge protection, load flow and voltage variation and 
transmission line design and route selection. Similarly their multi disciplinary 
s taff enables it to provide a range of services in prefeasibility investigations, 
feasibil i ty studies, field investigations and laboratory studies, design and 
preparat ion of cont rac t documents, contract management and construction 
supervision, operation and maintenance, and training in the disciplines 
of river basin studies, regional and rural development studies, dams, roads and 
bridges, water supply irrigation and flood control, tunnels and underground 
works, pipelines gates and valves, field investigations, laboratory studies, 
project management , and power generation and transmission. These services 
have been carried out in some countries including Afghanistan, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Botswana, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, 
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Papua, Phillipines, Saudi Arabia, United States, Vietnam and Yemen.[51J 
In 1985 the United States engineering magazine Engineering News - Record, 
ranked SMEC ^Ist in the top 200 engineering design consultants world wide, 
based on total fees earned outside home countries.[52j 
It can be seen then that not only have a large number of Australians 
and Australian companies benefited both directly and indirectly from the 
assistance provided by the USBR but so too have overseas countries by virtue 
of consulting projects undertaken by the Authority, SMEC, and other Aust-
ralian companies whose working practices draw on their experiences from 
the Scheme. 
Whilst an analysis of the costs and benefits of the role of the USBR is 
of interest, so too is an examination of the path by which the technology was 
transferred to the Authority. At the conceptual level there appear to be 
three different ways for organisations to transfer new and improved products 
and methods between countries: through subsidiaries or joint ventures 
set up with local partners; through licencing or sale of patents, trademarks, 
and other intellectual property rights; and through machinery and equipment 
sales or supply of turn-key plant.[53j However, whilst this differentiation 
appears relatively straight forward it was neither as clear in the 1950's 
nor as directly applicable to the Scheme as may be suggested, partly because 
the analysis goes more to private enterprise functions and partly because 
the Authority and the Bureau appear to have had a special type of relationship 
which does not fit any of the three paths. Issues of direct investment, 
global strategy, e f fects of balance of payments, and licencing agreements 
which tend to be of concern to host governments today when acquiring 
technology from private enterprise, did not appear to overly concern the 
Federal Government and the Authority during the construction phase of 
the Scheme. The two peak Governments dealt directly with each other 
as did the two Authority 's concerned, to the specific exclusion of private 
enterpr ise organisations. There did not appear to be a profit motive involved 
in the assistance provided by the Bureau, with overheads and other admini-
s t ra t ive charges having been kept to a minimal level. However, it could 
be speculated tha t the interests of the American Government were somewhat 
broader than the provision of assistance with regard to the construction 
of the Scheme. This indication of their preparedness to assist with such 
a venture especially when coupled with their role in the war e f fo r t and 
Australia 's increased reliance on them, could be seen as preparation for 
a longer term influence both within Australia and the larger regional area. 
It is questionable whether this type of arrangement for a major 
construction scheme could work in today's c l imate given the changes in 
funding. Governmental expectations for return on investment, the funding 
of research and development, and the closer relationships between aid 
provided to under-developed countries and their economic and political 
success, not to mention multi national corporations and the profit motive. 
Even if an arrangement such as that between the Authority and the Bureau 
were able to be put, it is doubtful whether the costs would be the same. 
In introducing technology and technology t ransfer it was s tated that 
change is o f ten a cumulative process which requires considerable human 
e f f o r t and commitment of resources. This was certainly t rue of the tech-
nology t ransfer between the USBR and the SMA. Whilst the basic engineering 
concepts remained the same the designs, plans and specifications all under-
went change as the Schenne gradually evolved, as did the methods for achiev-
ing its development particularly in the areas of work organisation. The 
Bureau, experienced in the provision of assistance to developing countries, 
insisted on the commitment by the Authority of dedicated human resources 
to assist in the transfer process. These included Australian liaison officers, 
co-ordination engineers, and frequent visits to America which in turn were 
reciprocated by Bureau personnel who visited the Authority to check develop-
ment, in addition of course to the provision of dedicated engineering advisors 
based on site in Australia. Other resources in terms of money, machinery 
and materials were all commited by the Authority and the Commonwealth 
Government on a progressive basis. 
The people involved in the development and construction of the 
Scheme, from the Governments of the U.S.A. and Australia, the staff of 
the USBR and the SMA, staff of the contractors, and the day labour forces 
all combined to ensure the successful completion of the Scheme. Some 
of them were formal agents of change and transfer whilst others were 
informal agents, some played major and long term roles whilst others were 
involved only briefly. Irrespective of their formal or informal status their 
contributions through planning, discussions, suggestions, directions, exhort-
ations, delegation, criticism, organisation and control, all assisted the appro-
priate contextual f i t and the requisite levels of communication. For some 
to be able to identify and be identified with a national project which was 
continuously publicised as the greatest engineering feat in Australia was 
sufficient motivation. For others the simple fact that they were employed 
and earning reasonable wages was sufficient motivation to endure the physical 
hardships associated with construction of the Scheme. This motivation 
to succeed permeated the workforce and greatly assisted the organisation's 
receptivity to new techniques. The fact that the Authority was created 
with the single purpose of first constructing and then operating the Scheme 
ensured that the full at tention of the staff was directed towards, and receptive 
to, the appropriate technologies. 
How then does one measure and report on whether the transfer of 
Technology from America to Australia, but more specifically from the 
USER to the Snowy Mountains Scheme, was successful? 
It would appear obvious that the USBR possessed, by virtue of the 
experience and expertise of its personnel and in its accumulated documentation 
information and skills required by the Authority to commence the planning 
and development of the Scheme. This planning and development was to 
not only draw on the stock of knowledge "in situ" in Denver but also later 
on from its advisors located in Australia. The speed with which the initial 
parts of the Scheme could be commenced was important for achievement 
of the Government's aims both for the Scheme and at the broader level 
in terms of national reconstruction and one suspects for political survival. 
For these lat ter reasons it is clear that the Government and the Scheme 
as the receiver of the Technology not only wanted the information but 
was prepared to initiate and support obtaining it. This is exemplified by 
the capital borrowings and financial outlay of the Government, by the 
establishment of an appropriate infrastructure, and by support for the 
continued development of its personnel. The mutual confidence which 
existed between the two National Governments and at Bureau and Authority 
level was created and enhanced by the interchange of staff in the very 
early days of the Scheme, e.g. visits by Mr (later Commissioner) Dexheimer 
of the USER to Australia, and Associate Commissioner Lang of the Authority 
to the USBR. Prior contac t with USBR staf f had been made by Hudson 
when with the Metropolitan Water Sewage 6c Drainage Board on the Warra-
gamba Dam project and of course through knowledge of the experience of 
USBR project work. The Authority had shown its bona fides also by written 
c o n t a c t with the US Government (through the Australian Embassy in 
Washington) and with consultants to the USBR who commented favourably 
on the job to be done and no doubt the public relations value of adding 
such a scheme to the Bureau's list of credits. The f a c t that the Australian 
Government was prepared to pay both for initial design assistance and 
for the training of some of its engineers at a t ime when there was an 
excess capaci ty within the Bureau would also no doubt have appealed. 
It should be obvious therefore that the Australian Government had 
a direct involvement in both the financial and human resource allocation 
issues, as well as enhancing the c l imate in which the technology transfer 
was to take place by a variety of measures including legislation, public 
relations and education. The Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Power Act 
19^9, the Authority's enabling legislation gave it enormous power over 
the gazet ted area including the power to take land on lease, take easements 
over land, sell or otherwise dispose of land vested in the Authority, (Section 
18), the power to enter land (Section 19), the power to enter and occupy 
land (Section 20), the power to raise or lower the level, impound, divert 
or use the waters of a lake, river or stream (Section 21). The most significant 
power though was that the Authority was able "to do anything incidental to 
its powers". (Section 18(j))[3^J The flooding and rebuilding of the township 
of Adaminaby is but one example of this power. 
Perhaps not surpr is ing ly , t he re was no g rea t c o m m u n i t y commen t 
about the f lood ings or damage to the env i ronment , due in no sma l l pa r t 
t o the huge pub l ic re la t ions campa ign mounted by both the A u t h o r i t y and 
the C o m m o n w e a l t h Gove rnmen t . This inc luded newspaper, rad io and la te r 
t e lev i s i on progress repor ts , the p roduc t ion of v ignet tes and news ree l i tems 
fo r mov ie thea t res , and handouts, brochures, books and other publ icat ions 
on the Scheme most l y p r i n ted w i t h i n i t s own p r i n te r y . In add i t ion t o these, 
the A u t h o r i t y commiss ioned f i l m s of the Scheme's development and conducted 
an ex tens ive system of publ ic re la t ions tours by both coach and car convoy. 
A t one stage the A u t h o r i t y had a publ ic re la t ions s ta f f in excess of 
and over the cons t ruc t i on days en te r ta ined an impressive l i s t of Roya l 
and o ther d ign i ta r ies and o f f i c i a l v is i to rs . Whi lst th is d i r ec t invo lvement 
is not of i t se l f a measure of the success of the t rans fe r of technology, 
i t is a ve ry good ind ica to r of the preparedness of the Government and 
the A u t h o r i t y t o ensure the foundat ions and support fo r con t inu ing deve lopment 
were present . Thus in se t t i ng these foundat ions the Government c rea ted 
not on ly a new organisat ion t ha t d id not su f fe r f r o m the norma l resistance 
t o change, especia l ly t o technology f r o m an ex t ra mura l source, [55] but 
also a m o t i v a t i o n and an a t t i t u d e to succeed both w i t h i n t ha t organisat ion 
and the c o m m u n i t y at large. No tw i ths tand ing i ts c r i t i c s , the m a j o r i t y 
of Aus t ra l ians today acknowledge the Scheme as one of th is nat ion 's greates t 
ach ievements . 
Ava i l ab le l i t e r a t u r e suggests tha t i f the enunciated needs are m e t , 
the de f ined requ i rements f u l f i l l e d , s ta ted goals a t ta ined , pe r fo rmance 
spec i f i ca t ions m e t , in short t ha t the requ i red job is done, then the t rans fe r 
of techno logy has been successful . Based on th is c r i t e r i a , the comp le t i on 
of the Upper Tumut works and f l ow ing f r o m tha t the cons t ruc t i on of the 
whole Scheme, was an outstanding success. From the design of the broad 
development parameters and the completion of operational and contrac t 
drawings, to the cont rac t supervision the Bureau's involvement conformed 
with, and in the f ace of lack of defined requirements as of ten occurred, 
specified them, for the Authority. The s tated goals, initially assistance 
with Modified Scheme C, but which as we have seen varied significantly 
over the period of the following ten years, were clearly met , at a cost, 
and within the t ime f rames al located. The fac t that both participants 
spoke the same language and possessed similar notions of education, class, 
and national interest also assisted in the smooth flow of scientif ic knowledge, 
techniques and information. 
There is no intention in this document to downgrade or in any way 
diminish the exceptional achievement of those individuals who were and 
a re collectively responsible for the conception, planning, construction, 
operation and maintenance of the Snowy Mountains Scheme. Rather it 
is the intention to acknowledge the significant role played by the personnel 
of the United States Bureau of Reclamation who manifestly assisted and 
material ly advanced the development of the Upper Tumut works of the 
Scheme and who a t the same t ime were responsible for the successful 
t rans fe r of relevant technology in the form of knowledge, techniques and 
information, to the Authority and in the longer term to Australia and overseas 
countries with which it has consulted. This successful t ransfer of technology 
was a joint venture between the Australian Government and the Snowy 
Mountains Authority and the United States Government and the Bureau 
of Reclamation, and was achieved because of direct legislation and financial 
assistance, indirect encouragement and support, training and development, 
both in America and Australia, technical assistance from the Bureau, 
creation of a suitable infrastructure, and technical advice from Bureau 
staff in Australia. 
A construction project, the magnitude of which had never before 
been a t tempted in Australia brought to successful completion under budget 
and under t ime, and which satisfied the design parameters must by definition 
be a success. The Snowy Mountains Scheme was and is a success, a success 
due in no small part to the successful transfer of technology from the 
United States Bureau of Reclamation. 
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